

DEUS JUSTIFICATUS:
OR, A
VINDICATION
OF THE
Glory of the DIVINE ATTRIBUTES,
In the Question of
ORIGINAL SIN:
AGAINST
The Presbyterian way of Understanding it.
In a Letter to a Person of Quality.

*Nam neque tam facilis res ulla est, quin ea primum,
Difficilis magis ad credendum constet. — Lucret.*

The Fourth Edition.

ALSO,
An ANSWER to a LETTER
Written by the R. R.
Lord Bishop of ROCHESTER,
Concerning the Chapter of
ORIGINAL SIN:
IN THE
UNUM NECESSARIUM.

By JER. TAYLOR, D. D. and late
Lord Bishop of Down and Connor.

LONDON: Printed for the Executors of L. M.
and Sold by James Holland, at the Bible and
Ball, the West End of St. Paul's Churchyard. 1711.

Right

C H

Cou

M A

W

iginal

en late

deavou

on, wi

re seen

hand

the A

edi

think

little

God

dle,

on ha

ase, a

rm n

ugs;

TO THE

Right Honourable and Religious Lady,

THE LADY

CHRISTIAN,

Countess Dowager of Devonshire.

M A D A M,

WHEN I reflect upon the infinite disputes which have troubled the publick Meetings of Christendom concerning Original Sin, and how impatient and vext some have lately been, when I offered to them my observations and conjectures concerning that Question, with purposes very differing from what were seen in the face of other Men's designs, and handled it so, that GOD might be glorified in the Article, and Men might be instructed and edified in order to good life; I could not think that wise Heathen said rarely well in a little adage, relating to the present subject; *ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τοῦ σκοτεινοῦ ἐγεννήθη*. Mankind was born to be a *dark*, and our nativity is in the dark; for we have taken the liberty to think what they please, and to say what they think; and they affirm many things, and can prove but few things; and take the sayings of Men for the

Oracles of GOD, and bold affirmatives, convincing arguments; and S. Paul's Text may be understood by S. Austin's commentary, and S. Austin shall be heard in all, because he speaks against such Men who in some things were not to be heard; and after all, because his Doctrine was taken for granted by ignorant Ages, and being received so long, was incorporated into the resolved Doctrine of the Church, with so great a firmness; it became almost a shame to examine what the world believed so unsuspectingly; and he that shall first attempt it, must resolve to give up a great portion of his reputation to be torn in pieces by the ignorant and by the zealous, by some of the Learned, and by all the Envious; and they who love to teach in quietness being at rest in their Chairs and Pulpits, will be froward when they are awakened; and rather than they will be suspected to have taught an error, will justify an error by the reproaching of him that tells them truth, which they are pleased to call new.

If any Man differs from me in opinion, I am not troubled at it, but tell him that truth is in the Understanding, and charity is in the Will, and is or ought to be there, before either his or my opinion in these controversies can end; and therefore that we ought to love all, though we do not understand alike; but when I find that Men are angry at my Ingenuity and openness of discourse, and endeavour to hinder the event of my labours, in the ministering to Souls, and are impatient of contradiction, and variety of explication, and understanding

The Epistle Dedicatory.

v

Questions, I think my self concerned to defend
the truth which I have published, to acquit it
from the suspicion of evil appendages, to de-
monstrate not only the truth, but the piety of
it, and the necessity, and those great advantages
which by this Doctrine so understood may be
reaped, if Men will be quiet and patient, void
of Prejudice, and not void of Charity.

This (Madam) is reason sufficient why I
offer so many justifications of my Doctrine, be-
cause any Man appears in publick against it; but
because there are many who do enter into the
causes of the rich and the honourable, and whisper
secret oppositions and accusations, rather than
all arguments against my Doctrine; the good Wo-
men that are zealous for Religion, and make
in the passions of one faculty what is not so
possible in the actions and operations of an-
other, are sure to be affrighted before they be
instructed, and Men enter caveats in that Court
before they try the cause: But that is not
all; For I have found, that some Men, to
whom I gave and designed my labours, and for
whose sake I was willing to suffer the persecu-
tion of a suspected truth, have been so unjust
to me, and so unserviceable to your self
(Madam) and to some other excellent and
other personages, as to tell stories, and give
names to my proposition; and by secret murmurs
under you from receiving that good which your
wisdom and your piety would have discerned
there, if they had not affrighted you with tel-
ling, that a Snake lay under the Plantane,
and that this Doctrine, which is as wholesome as

the fruits of Paradise, was enwrapped with the infolding of a Serpent, subtile and fallacious.

Madam, I know the arts of these Men and they often put me in mind of what was told me by Mr. Sackvill the late Earl of Dorset's Uncle; that the cunning Sects of the World, (he named the Jesuits and the Presbyterians) did more prevail by whispering to Ladies, than all the Church of England and the more sober Protestants could do by force and strength of argument. For they by prejudice or fears, terrible things and zealous nothings, confident sayings and little stories governing the Ladies Consciences, who can persuade their Lords, their Lords will convert their Tenants, and so the World is at their own. I should wish them all good in their profits and purchases, if the case were otherwise than it is: But because they are questions of Souls, of their interest and advantages, I cannot wish they may prevail with the more Religious and Zealous Personages. And therefore (Madam) I have taken the boldness to write this tedious Letter to you that I may give you a right understanding and an easie explication of this great Question as concerning my self the more bound to do to your satisfaction, not only because you are Zealous for the Religion of this Church, and are as person as Reason as well as of Religion but also because you have passed divers obligations upon me, for which all my services are too little a return.

A VINDICATION OF THE Glory of the DIVINE ATTRIBUTES, In the Question of ORIGINAL SIN.

IN Order to which, I will plainly describe the great lines of difference and danger, which are in the errors and mistakes about this Question.

2. I will prove the truth and necessity of my own, together with the usefulness and reasonableness of it.

3. I will answer those little murmurs, by which (so far as I can yet learn) these Men seek to invade the understandings of those who have not leisure or will to examine the thing itself in my own words and arguments.

4. And if any thing else falls in by the by, in which I can give satisfaction to a Person of Your great Worthiness, I will not omit it; as being desirous to have this Doctrine set out as fair in your eyes, as it is in all its own colours and proportions.

But first (Madam) be pleased to remember, that the question is not whether there be any such thing as *Original Sin*; for it is certain, and confessed on all hands almost. For my part, I cannot but confess that to be which I feel, and groan under, and by which all the world is miserable.

Adam turned his back upon the Sun, and dwelt in the dark and the shadow; he sinned, and fell into God's displeasure, and was made naked of all his supernatural endowments, and was ashamed and sentenced to death, and deprived of the means of long life, and of the Sacrament and Instrument of Immortality; I mean, the Tree of Life; he then fell under the evils of a sickly body, and a passionate, ignorant, uninstructed soul; his sin made

him sickly, his sickness made him peevish, his sin left him ignorant, his ignorance made him foolish and unreasonable: His sin left him to his nature, and by his nature whoever was to be born at all, was to be born a child and to do before he could understand, and be bred under Laws, to which he was always bound, but which could not always be exacted; and he was to chuse, when he could not reason, and had passions most strong, when he had his understanding most weak, and was to ride a wild horse without a bridle, and the more need he had of curb, the less strength he had to use it; and this being the case of all the World, what was *every man's* evil, became all men's greater evil; and though alone it was very bad, yet when they came together it was made much worse, like Ships in a storm, every one alone hath enough to out-ride it; but when they meet, besides the evils of the storm, they find the intolerable calamity of the mutual concussion; and every Ship that is ready to be oppressed with the tempest, is a worse tempest to every vessel, against which it is violently dashed. So it is in mankind, every man hath evil enough of his own; and it is hard for a man to live soberly, temperately, and religiously, but when he hath Parents and Children, Brothers and Sisters, Friends and Enemies, Buyers and Sellers, Lawyers and Physicians, a Family and a Neighbourhood, a King over him, or Tenants under him, a Bishop to rule in matters of Government Spiritual, and a People to be ruled by him in the affairs of their Souls; then it is that every man dashes against another, and one relation requires what another denies; and when one speaks, another will contradict him; and that which is well spoken, is sometimes innocently mistaken, and that upon a good cause produces an evil effect; and by these, and ten thousand other concurrent causes, man is made more than most miserable.

But the main thing is this; when God was angry with *Adam*, the man fell from the state of grace; for God withdrew his grace, and we returned to the state of mere nature, of our prime creation. And although I am not in *Petrus Diaconus* his mind, who said, that when we all fell in *Adam*, we fell into the dirt, and not only so, but we fell also upon a heap of stones; so that we not only were made naked, but defiled also, and broken all in pieces; yet I do believe to be certain, that we by his fall receive

evil enough
did so desce
capacities
made much
made miser
actual mor
power of D
it was
destroyed;
capable of
ad wound
meritan
were cured
ained us u
together
ake it,
fect of

*A

*C

T

Ma

Hin

He

He

But to
be expo

sum rati

the con

on, but

and no br

And inde

of the ev

soul is in

alienâ do

Measures

and Incl

the body

exatiou

according

Will, ca

impresses

otions

and a gr

ey

evil enough to undo us, and ruine us all; but yet the evil did so descend upon us, that we were left in powers and capacities to serve and glorifie God; God's service was made much harder, but not impossible; mankind was made miserable, but not desperate; we contracted an actual mortality, but we were redeemable from the power of Death; sin was easie and ready at the door, but it was resistable; our *Will* was abused, but yet not destroyed; our Understanding was cosened, but yet still capable of the best instructions; and though the Devil had wounded us, yet God sent his Son, who like the good Samaritan poured Oil and Wine into our wounds, and we were cured before we felt the hurt, that might have ruined us upon that Occasion. It is sad enough, but not altogether so intolerable, and decretory, as some would make it, which the *Sibylline* Oracle describes to be the effect of *Adam's* sin:

Ἀνθρωπος, πῆπλασται θεῷ παλαμαῖς, ἐνὶ αὐταῖς,
Ὅν τε πλάνησεν ὄφις δόλιος ἐπὶ μοῖραν ἀνέλθην
Τὸ θάνατῷ, γινῶσιν τε λαβεῖν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ ἔτε.

*Man was the work of God, fram'd by his hands,
Him did the Serpent cheat, that to death's bands
He was subjected for his sin: for this was all,
He tasted good and evil by his fall.*

But to this we may superadd that which *Plutarch* found to be experimentally true, *Mirum quod pedes moverent ad sum rationis, nullo autem freno passiones*: The foot moves at the command of the Will, and by the Empire of Reason, but the Passions are stiff even when the knee bends, and no bridle can make the Passions regular and temperate. And indeed (Madam) this is in a manner the sum total of the evil of our abused and corrupted nature: Our soul is in the body, as in a Prison; it is there *tanquam in alienâ domo*, it is a sojourner, and lives by the body's Measures, and loves and hates by the body's Interests and Inclinations; that which is pleasing and nourishing to the body, the soul chuses and delights in; that which is vexatious and troublesome, it abhors, and hath motions accordingly: For Passions are nothing else but acts of the Will, carried to or from material Objects, and effects and impressions upon the man, made by such acts; consequent motions and productions from the Will. It is a useless and a groundless proposition in Philosophy, to make the Passions

Passions to be the emanations of distinct faculties, seated in a differing region; for as the reasonable Soul both sensitive and vegetative, so is the Will elective and passionate, the region both of choice and passions; it is, when the Object is immaterial, or the motives spiritual, the act of the Will is so merely intellectual, that it is the proper and symbolical, and the act of it we call election or volition; but if the Object is material or corporeal, the acts of the Will are passion, that is, adhesion and aversion; and these it receives by the needs and inclinations of the body: An Object can diversify an act, but never distinguish faculties: And we make it one faculty that chooses a reasonable Object and another that chooses the sensual; we may as well affirm a third faculty for the supernatural and religious; and when to choose a sensual Object, is always either reasonable or unreasonable; and every adherence to pleasure and mortification or refusing of it, is subject to a command, and the matter of duty; it will follow, that even the passions also are issues of the Will: By passion meaning the actions of prosecution or refusal of sensitive Objects, the acts of the Concupiscible and Irascible appetite; not the impressions made by these upon the body as trembling, redness, paleness, heaviness, and the like. And therefore to say, the Passions rule the Will, is an improper saying; but it hath no truth in its meaning but this, that the Will is more passionate than wise; it is more delighted with Bodily pleasures than Spiritual: But as the Understanding considers both, and the disputation about them is in that faculty alone; so the choice of both is in the Will alone. Now because many of the body's needs are naturally necessary, and the rest are made so by being thought needs, and by being so naturally pleasant and that this is the body's day, and it rules here in its own place and time; therefore it is that the Will is so great a scene of Passion, and we so great Servants of our Bodies.

This was the great effect of *Adam's* sin, which became therefore to us a punishment, because of the appendant infirmity that went along with it; for *Adam* being spoiled of all the rectitudes and supernatural heights of grace and thrust back to the form of nature, and left to derive grace to himself by a new Oeconomy, or to be without it; and his posterity left just so as he was left himself; he

was

submitted to the power of his enemy that betray'd
and put under the power of his body, whose appe-
tites would govern him; and when they would grow
irregular, could not be mastered by any thing that was
natural to him, or born with him; so that his case was mi-
serable and naked, and his state of things was imperfect,
and would be disordered,

but now (Madam) things being thus bad, are made
worse by the superinduced Doctrines of men; which
when I have represented to your Ladiship, and told upon
what accounts I have reprov'd them, you will find that I
speak reason.

There are one sort of *Calvin's* Scholars, whom we for
the Church's sake call *Supralapsarians*, who are so fierce in
their sentences of predestination and reprobation, that
they say, God looked upon mankind, only as his Crea-
ture and his slaves, over whom he having absolute power,
was very gracious that he was pleas'd to take some few,
and save them absolutely; and to the other greater part
he did no wrong, though he was pleas'd to damn them
eternally, only because he pleas'd; for they were his own;
and, *Qui jure suo utitur, nemini facit injuriam*, says the
Law of Reason, every one may do what he pleases with
his own. But this bloody and horrible opinion is held
only by a few; as tending directly to the dishonour of
God, charging on Him alone, that He is the cause of
men's sins on Earth, and of men's eternal torments in Hell;
it makes God to be powerful, but his power not to be
good; it makes him more cruel to Men, than good Men
can be to Dogs and Sheep; it makes him give the final
sentence of Hell, without any pretence or colour of justice;
it represents him to be that which all the World must na-
turally fear, and naturally hate, as being a God delighting
in the death of innocents; for so they are when he resolves
to damn them: And then most tyrannically cruel, and
unreasonable; for it says, that to make a postulate pretence
of justice, it decrees that men inevitably shall sin, that they
may inevitably, but justly, be damned; like the *Roman*
Victors, who because they could not put to death *Sejanus's*
daughters, as being Virgins, deflower'd them after sentence,
that by that barbarity they might be capable of the utmost
cruelty: It makes God to be all that, for which any
other thing or person is, or can be hated; for it makes him
neither to be good, nor just, nor reasonable; but a mighty
enemy

Sueton. in
vita Tiber.
c. 54.

enemy to the biggest part of mankind; it makes him hate what himself hath made, and to punish that another, which in himself he decreed should not be avoided. It charges the wisdom of God with folly, as having means to glorifie his justice but by doing unjustly, bringing in that which himself hates, that he might do what himself loves; doing as *Tiberius* did to *Brutus* and *Nero*, the Sons of *Germanicus*; *Variâ fraude induxit ut citarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur*; provoking them to rail, that he might punish their reproaching. This opinion reproaches the words of the Spirit of Scripture, it charges God with Hypocrisie and want of Mercy, making him a Father of Cruelties, not of Mercy; and a perfect overthrow of all Religion, and all Laws, and Government; it destroys the very being, and nature of Election, thrusting a Man down to the lowest form of Beasts and Birds, to whom a Spontaneity of doing certain actions is given by God, but it is in them so natural, that it is unavoidable. Now concerning this horrid opinion for my part shall say nothing but this; That he that says there was no such man as *Alexander*, would tell a horrible lie, and be injurious to all story, and to the memory and fame of that great Prince; but he that should say, It is true there was such a man as *Alexander*, but he was a Tyrant, and a Blood-sucker, cruel and injurious, false and dissembling, an enemy of mankind, and for all the reason of the world to be hated and reproached, would certainly dishonour *Alexander* more, and be his greatest enemy. So I think in this, That the Atheists, who deny there is a God, do not so impiously against God, as they that charge him with foul appellatives, or maintain such sentences, which, if they were true, God could not be true. But these men (Madam) have nothing to do in the Question of Original Sin, save only, that they say God did decree that *Adam* should fall; and all the sins that he sinned, and all the world after him, are no effects of choice, but of predestination; that is, they were the actions of God rather than man.

But because these men even to their brethren seem to speak evil things of God, therefore the more wary and temperate of the *Calvinists* bring down the order of reprobation lower; affirming that God looked upon all mankind in *Adam* as fallen into his displeasure, hated by God, truly guilty of his sin, liable to Eternal Damnation, and

being all
some, th
to He
er, leaving
they think
sign and do
Now to br
al Sin:

1. That b
al righte
me dead i
arts of soul
2. That v
r this sin,
uilt of this
eir poster
3. That
disposed,
holly incl
4. This
d althou
et both i
properly fi
5. Orig
laws of C
ature bri
ver to th
made sub
al, and e
ly at *W*
Against
have m
Question
Presbyter
against u
ernmen

He is ne
have as
some of
and the
truth an

being all equally condemned, he was pleased to separate some, the smaller number far, and irresistibly bring them to Heaven; but the far greater number he passed over, leaving them to be damned for the sin of Adam; and they think they save God's Justice: and this was the design and device of the Synod of Dort.

Now to bring this to pass, they teach concerning Original Sin:

1. That by this sin our first Parents fell from their Original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.

2. That whatsoever death was due to our first Parents for this sin, they being the root of all mankind, and the guilt of this sin being imputed, the same is conveyed to all their posterity by ordinary generation.

3. That by this Original corruption we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil; and that from hence proceed all actual transgressions.

4. This corruption of nature remains in the regenerate, and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both itself and all the motions thereof, are truly and properly sin.

5. Original sin being a transgression of the righteous laws of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the Law, and so made subject to death with all miseries, spiritual, temporal, and eternal. These are the sayings of the late Assembly at Westminster.

Against this heap of errors and dangerous propositions, I have made my former discourings, and statings of the Question of Original Sin. These are the Doctrines of the Presbyterians, whose face is towards us, but it is over against us in this, and many other Questions of great concernment.

Nemo est tam propè, tam procùlque nobis :

He is nearest to us, and farthest from us. But because I have as great a love to their Persons, as I have a dislike to some of their Doctrines, I shall endeavour to serve truth and them, by reprovng those propositions which make truth and them to stand at distance.

Now

Now I shall first speak to the thing in general, its designs; then I shall make some observations upon particulars.

1. This device of our *Presbyterians* and of the Synod *Dort*, is but an artifice to save their proposition harmless and to stop the out-cries of Scripture and Reason, and all the World against them. But this way of stating the Article of Reprobation, is as horrid in effect as other. For,

1. Is it by a natural consequent that we are guilty of *Adam's* sin, or is it by the decree of God? Naturally cannot be; for then the sins of all our forefathers, who are to their posterity the same that *Adam* was to his, must be ours; and not only *Adam's* first sin, but his others are ours upon the same account. But if it be by the Decree of God by his choice and constitution, that it should be so, (

Instit. l. 3. Mr. *Calvin* and Dr. *Twiss* (that I may name no more of that side) do expressly teach) it follows, that God is the Author of our Sin: So that I may use Mr. *Calvin's* words. *Vind. Grat. l. 1. p. di-* "How is it, that so many Nations with their Children *gref. 4. c. 3.* "should be involved in the Fall without remedy, but because God would have it so? And if that be the matter, then to God, as to the cause, must that sin, and the damnation be accounted.

And let it then be considered, whether this be not as bad as the worst: For the *Supralapsarians* say, God did decree that the greatest part of mankind should perish, only because he would: The *Sublapsarians* say, that God made it by his decree necessary, that all we who were born of *Adam*, should be born guilty of Original Sin; and he was who decreed to damn whom he pleased for that sin in which he decreed they should be born; and both of these he did for no other consideration, but because he would. Is it not therefore evident, that he absolutely decreed Damnation to these Persons? For he that decrees the end, and he that decrees the only necessary and effective means to the end, and decrees that it shall be the end of that means, does decree absolutely alike; though by several dispensations: And then all the evil consequents which are reckoned before to be the monstrous productions of the first way, are Daughters of the other; and if *Solomon* were here, he could not tell which were the truer Mother.

Now that the case is equal between them, some of their own chiefest do confess; so Dr. *Twiss*, If God may ordain

Men

men to Hell for *Adam's* sin, which is derived unto them by God's only constitution: He may as well do it absolutely, without any such constitution: The same also is affirmed by *Maccovius*, and by Mr. *Calvin*: And the reason is plain; for he that does a thing for a reason which himself makes, may as well do it without a reason: Or he may make his own Will to be the reason; because the reason, and the motive of the thing, come in both cases, equally from the same principle, and from that alone.

Now (Madam) be pleased to say, whether I had not reason and necessity for what I have taught: You are a happy Mother of a fair and hopeful Posterity, your Children and Nephews are dear to you as your right eye, and yet you cannot love them so well as God loves them; and it is possible that a Mother should forget her Children, yet God even then will not, cannot; but if our Father and Mother forsake us, God taketh us up. Now (Madam) consider, could you have found in your heart, when the Murders and Midwives had bound up the heads of any of your Children, when you had born them with pain and joy upon your knees, could you have been tempted to give command that murderers should be brought to slay them alive, to put them to exquisite tortures; and then in the midst of their saddest groans, throw any one of them into the flames of a fierce fire; for no other reason, but because he was born at *London*, or upon a Friday, when the Moon was in her prime, or for what other reason you had made, and they could never avoid? Could you have been delighted in their horrid shrieks and out-cries, or have taken pleasure in their unavoidable and their intolerable calamity? Could you have smiled, if the hang-man had hatched your eldest Son from his Nurse's breasts, and dashed his brains out against the pavement; and would you not have wondred, that any Father or Mother could espy the innocence and pretty smiles of their sweet babes, and yet tear their limbs in pieces, or devise devillish artifices to make them roar with intolerable convulsions? Could you desire to be thought good, and yet have delighted in such cruelty? I know I may answer for you; you would first have killed your self. And yet I say again, God loves mankind better than we can love one another; and he is essentially just, and he is infinitely merciful, and he is all goodness; and therefore though we might possibly do evil things, yet yet he cannot: And yet this Doctrine of the *Presbyterian*

Repro-

Reprobation, says he both can, and does things, the apprehension of which hath caused many in despair drown or hang themselves.

Now if the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation be so horrid, so intolerable a proposition, so unjust and blasphemous to God, so injurious and cruel to men, and that there is no colour or pretence to justify it, but by pretending our guilt of *Adam's* sin, and damnation to be the punishment: Then because from truth nothing but truth can issue; that must needs be a lie, from which such horrid consequences do proceed. For the case in short is this. If it be just for God to damn any one of *Adam's* Posterity for *Adam's* sin, then it is just in him to damn all; for all his Children are equally guilty; and then if he spares any it is Mercy: and the rest who perish, have no cause to complain. But if all these fearful consequences, which Reason and Religion so much abhor, do so certainly follow from such doctrines of Reprobation, and these doctrines wholly rely upon this pretence, it follows, that the pretence is infinitely false and intolerable; and that (so far as we understand the rules and measures of Justice) it cannot be just for God to damn us for being in a state of calamity, to which state we entred no way but by his constitution and decree.

You see (Madam) I had reason to reprove that doctrine, which said, It was just in God to damn us for the sin of *Adam*.

Though this be the main error; yet there are some other collateral things which I can by no means approve, such are these, 1. That by the Sin of *Adam*, our Parents became wholly defiled in all the Faculties and Powers of their Souls and Bodies. And 2. That by this we also are disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil. And 3. That from hence proceed all actual transgressions. And 4. That our natural corruption in the regenerate still remains, though it be pardoned and mortified, and is still properly a sin.

Against this, I opposed these Propositions: That the effect of *Adam's* sin was in himself bad enough; for it divested him of that state of grace and favour in which God placed him; it threw him from *Paradise*, and all the advantages of that place, it left him in the state of Nature; but yet his nature was not spoiled by that sin; he was not wholly inclined to all evil, neither was he disabled, and

made

made opposite to all good; only his good was imperfect; he was natural, and fell short of Heaven; for till his nature was invested with a new nature, he could not go farther than the design of his first nature; that is, without Christ, without the Spirit of Christ, he could never arrive at Heaven, which is his supernatural condition: But 1. There still remained in him a natural freedom of doing good or evil. 2. In every one that was born, there are great inclinations to some good. 3. Where our Nature was averse to good, it is not the direct *sin of Nature*, but the imperfection of it; the reason being, because God superinduced Laws against our natural inclination; and yet there was in nature nothing sufficient to make us contradict our nature in our obedience to God; all that being to come from a supernatural and Divine principle. These I shall prove together, for one depends upon another.

1. And first, That the liberty of will did not perish to mankind by the fall of *Adam* is so evident, that *St. Austin*, who is an adversary in some parts of this Question, but not yet, by way of question and confidence asks, *Quis autem nostrum dicat quod primi hominis peccato, perierit liberum arbitrium de humano genere?* Which of us can say, That the liberty of Will did perish by the Sin of the first Man? And he adds a rare reason; for it is so certain, that it did not perish in a sinner, that this thing only is it by which they do sin; especially when they delight in their sin, and by the love of sin, that thing is pleasing to them which they list to do.] And therefore when we are charged with sin, it is worthy of enquiry, whence is it that we are sinners? Is it by the necessity of Nature, or by the liberty of our Will? If by nature and not choice, then it is good and not evil; for whatsoever is our Nature, is of God's making, and consequently is good; but if we are sinners by choice and liberty of will, whence had we this liberty? If from *Adam*, then we have not lost it; but if we had it not from him, then from him we do not derive all our sin; for by this liberty alone we sin.

If it be replied, that we are free to sin, but not to good; it is such a foolery, and the cause of the mistake so evident, and so ignorant, that I wonder any man of Learning or common sense should own it. For if I be free to evil, then I can chuse evil, or refuse it; If I can refuse it, then

B

I can

Lib. 1. ad Bonifac. c. 2.

I can do good; for to refuse that evil is good, and it is in the Commandment, [*Eschew Evil*;] but if I cannot chuse or refuse it, how am I free to evil? For *Voluntas* and *Libertas*, *Will* and *Liberty*, in Philosophy are not the same: I may will it, when I cannot will the contrary as the Saints in Heaven, and God himself wills good they cannot will evil, because to do so is imperfection and contrary to felicity; but here is no liberty: for liberty is with power, to do, or not to do; to do this, or the contrary: and if this liberty be not in us, we are not in the state of obedience, or of disobedience; which is the state of all them who are alive, who are neither in Heaven nor Heaven. For it is to many purposes useful, that we consider, that in natural things to be determined, shews narrowness of being; and therefore liberty of action is better, because it approaches nearer to infinity. But in moral things, liberty is a direct imperfection, a state of weakness; and supposes weakness of reason, and weakness of love; the imperfection of the agent, or the unworthiness of the object: Liberty of Will is like the motion of a Magnetick-Needle toward the North, full of trepidation, till it be fixt where it would fain dwell for ever. Either the object is but good in one regard, or we have but an uncertain apprehension, or but a beginning love of it; or it could never be that we could be free to chuse that is, to love it, or not to love it. And therefore it is far from being true, that by the fall of *Adam* we lost our liberty, that it is more likely to be the consequence of sin, as being a state of imperfection; proper indeed to them who are to live under Laws, and to such who are to work for a reward, and may fail of it; but cannot go away, till we either lose all hopes of good by descending into Hell, or are past all fear or possibility of evil by going to Heaven. But that this is our case, if I had no other argument in the world, and were never so prejudicate and obstinate a person, I think I should be perfectly convinced by the words of *S. Paul*, 1 *Cor.* 7. 37. The Apostle speaks of a good act, tending not only to the keeping of a Precept but to a Counsel of perfection; and concerning that, he hath these words; *Nevertheless he that standeth steadfast in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath so decreed in his heart that he will keep his Virginity doth well*; the words are plain, and need no explication. If this be not a plain liberty of choice, and a power

will, those words mean nothing, and we can never hope to understand one another's meaning. But if sin be avoidable, then we have liberty of choice. If it is unavoidable, it is not imputable by the Measures of Laws and Justice; that it is by Empire and Tyranny, let the Adversaries acquire and prove: But since all Theology, all School's Learning consent in this, that an invincible or unavoidable ignorance does wholly excuse from sin; why an invincible and unavoidable necessity shall not also excuse, I confess I have not yet been taught.

But if by Adam's sin we be so utterly indisposed, disabled, and opposite to all good, wholly inclined to evil, and from hence come all actual sins; that is, that by Adam we are brought to that pass, that we cannot chuse but sin; it is a strange severity, that this should descend upon Persons otherwise most innocent; and that this which is the most grievous of all evils, for, *Prima & maxima peccantium poena est peccasse*, (said Seneca) to be given over to sin, is the worst calamity, the most extreme anger, never inflicted directly at all for any sin, as I have elsewhere proved, and not indirectly, but upon the extremest anger; which cannot be supposed, unless God be more angry with us for being born Men, than for refusing to be sinners.

Doctr. and
Pract. of
Repent.

The Consequent of these Arguments is this; That our faculties are not so wholly spoiled by Adam's fall, but that we can chuse good or evil, that our nature is not wholly disabled, and made opposite to all good; but to nature we left and given, as much as to the handmaid Agar; nature hath nothing to do with the inheritance, but she and her sons have gifts given them; and by nature we have laws of Vertue, and Inclinations to Vertue; and naturally we love God, and worship him, and speak good things of him; and love our Parents, and abstain from intemperate mixtures, and are pleased when we do well, and affrighted within, when we sin in horrid instances against God: And all this is in Nature, and much good comes from Nature; *Neque enim quasi lassæ & effæta natura est, ut nihil jam laudabile pariat*; Nature is not so old, so obsolete and dried a trunk, as to bring no good fruits upon its own stock; and the Frenchmen have a good proverb, *Bonus sanguis non mentitur*, a good blood never lies; and some men are naturally chaste, and some are abstemious, and many are just and friendly, and noble and

Plin. Ep.
12. lib.

charitable: And therefore all actual sins do not proceed from this sin of *Adam*; for if the sin of *Adam* left us in liberty to sin, and that this liberty was before *Adam's* fall, then it is not long of *Adam's* fall that we sin: By his fall it should rather be, according to their principles, that we cannot chuse but do this or that, and then it is no sin. But to say that our actual sins should any more proceed from *Adam's* fall, than *Adam's* fall should proceed from himself, is not to be imagined; for what made *Adam* sin, when he fell? If a fatal decree made him sin, then he was nothing to blame.

*Fati ista culpa est,
Nemo fit fato nocens.*

No guilt upon mankind can lie,
For what's the fault of destiny.

And *Adam* might with just reason lay the blame from himself, and say as *Agamemnon* in *Homer*,

----- ἵνα δ' ἐκ αἵματος αἰμὴ,
'Αλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ μοῖρα, καὶ ἡετορσίης Ἑρμῆς.

It was not I that sinned, but it was fate or a fury, it was God, and not I, it was not my act, but the effect of the divine decree; and then the same decree may make us sin, and not the sin of *Adam* be the cause of it. But if a liberty of will made *Adam* sin, then this liberty to sin being still left us, this liberty, and not *Adam's* sin, is the cause of our actual sins.

Concerning the other clause in the *Presbyterian* Article that our natural corruption in the regenerate still remain, and is still a sin, and properly a sin: I have (I confess) heartily opposed it, and shall besides my arguments, confirm it with my blood, if God shall call me; for it is a great reproach to the spirit and power of Christ, and the effects of Baptism, to Scripture and to Right Reason, that all good people are bound in Conscience to be zealous against it.

For when Christ came to reconcile us to his Father, he came to take away our sins, not only to pardon them, but to destroy them; and if the regenerate, in whom the spirit of Christ rules, and in whom all their habitual sins are dead, are still under the servitude, and in the stocks of Original Sin; then it follows, not only that our guilt of *Adam's* sin is greater than our own actual; the sin that we never consented to, is of a deeper grain than that which we have chosen and delighted in; and God will

more angry with *Cain* that he was born of *Adam*, than that he kill'd his Brother; and *Judas*, by descent from the first *Adam*, contracted that sin which he could never be quit of; but he might have been quit of betraying the second *Adam*, if he would not have despaired; I say not only these horrid consequences do follow, but this also will follow; that *Adam's* sin hath done some mischief, that the grace of *Christ* can never cure; and generation stains so much, that regeneration cannot wash it clean. Besides all this, if the natural corruption remains in the regenerate, and be properly a sin, then either God hates the regenerate, or loves the sinner; and when he dies he must enter into Heaven, with that sin, which he cannot lay down but in the grave, as the vilest sinner lays down every sin; and then an unclean thing can go to Heaven, or else no man can: And lastly, to say that this natural corruption, though it be *pardoned* and *mortified*, yet still remains, and is still a sin, is perfect nonsense: For if it be *mortified*, it is not, it hath no being; if it is *pardoned*, it was indeed, but now is no sin; for till a man can be guilty of sin without obligation to punishment, a sin cannot be a sin that is pardoned; that is, if the obligation to punishment, or the guilt be taken away, a man is not guilty. Thus far (*Madam*) I hope you will think I had reason.

One thing more I did, and do reprove in their *Westminster* Articles; and that is, that Original sin, meaning, our sin derived from *Adam*, is contrary to the Law of God, and doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner; binding him over to God's wrath, &c. that is, that the sin of *Adam* imputed to us is properly, formally and inherently a sin. If it were properly a sin in us, *our sin*, it might indeed be damnable; for every transgression of the Divine Commandment is so: But because I have proved it cannot bring eternal damnation, I can as well argue thus: This sin cannot justly bring us damnation, therefore it is not properly a sin: as to say, this is properly a sin, therefore it can bring us to damnation. Either of them both follow well: but because they cannot prove it to be a sin properly, or any other ways but by a limited imputation to certain purposes; they cannot say it infers damnation. But because I have proved, it cannot infer damnation, I can safely conclude, it is not formally, properly, and inherently a sin in us.

The Divine Goodness and Justice

Nec placet ô superi, vobis cum vertere cuncta
Propositum, nostris erroribus addere crimen.

Nor did it please our God, when that our state
Was chang'd, to add a crime unto our fate.

I have now (Madam) though much to your trouble quitted my self of my *Presbyterian* opponents, so far as can judge fitting for the present: But my friends will take some exceptions; and there are some objections made, and blows given me, as it happened to our Blessed Saviour, *in domo illorum qui diligebant me*; in the house of my Mother, and in the societies of some of my Dearest Brethren. For the case is this:

They join with me in all this that I have said, *viz.* That Original Sin is ours only by imputation; that it leaves still in our natural liberty, and tho' it hath divested us of our supernaturals, yet that our nature is almost the same and by the grace of Jesus as capable of Heaven, as it could ever be by derivation of Original Righteousness from *Adam*. In the conduct and in the description of this Question, being usually esteemed to be only Scholastical, I confess they (as all men else) do usually differ; for it was long ago observed, that there are sixteen several famous Opinions in this one Question of Original Sin. But my Brethren are willing to confess, that for *Adam's* sin alone no man did, or shall ever perish. And that it is rather to be called a stain, than a sin. If they were all of one mind and one voice in this Article, though but thus far, it would not move a stone to disturb it; but some draw one way, and some another, and they that are aptest to understand the whole secret, do put fetters and bars upon their own understanding, by an importune regard to the great names of some dead men, who are called *masters upon earth*, and whose authority is as apt to mislead us in some propositions, as their learning is useful to guide us in others: But so it happens, that because all are not of one mind, I cannot give account of every disagreeing man; but of that which is most material, I shall. Some learned persons are content I should say, no man is damned for the sin of *Adam* alone; but yet that we stand guilty in *Adam*, and redeemed from this damnation by Christ; and if that the Article were so stated, it would not intrench upon the *justice* or the *goodness* of God; for his *justice* would be sufficiently declared, because no man can complain of wrong done him, when the evil that he fell

into by *Adam*, is taken off by *Christ*; and *his goodness* is manifest in making a new *Census* for us, taxing and numbering us in *Christ*, and giving us free *Redemption* by the blood of *Jesus*: But yet that we ought to confess, that we are liable to damnation by *Adam*, and saved from thence by *Christ*; that *God's justice* may be glorified in that, and his *goodness* in *this*: but that we are still real sinners, till washed in the blood of the Lamb; and without *God*, and without hopes of Heaven, till then: And if this Article be thus handled, the *Presbyterian* fancy will disappear; for they can be confuted, without denying *Adam's* sin to be damnable; by saying it is pardoned in *Christ*, and in *Christ* all men are restored, and he is the head of the *Predestination*; for in him *God* looked upon us, when he designed us to our final state; and this (say they) is much for the honour of *Christ's* *Redemption*.

To these things (*Madam*) I have much to say; something I will trouble your Ladyship withal at this time, that you and all that consider the particulars may see, I could not do the work of *God* and truth, if I had proceeded in that method. For,

1. It is observable that those wiser persons, who will by no means admit that any one is or ever shall be damned for *Original* sin, do by this means hope to salve the justice of *God*: By which they plainly imply, that to damn us for this, is hard and intolerable; and therefore they suppose they have declared a remedy. But then this also is to be considered; If it be intolerable to damn children for the sin of *Adam*, then it is intolerable to say it is *damnable*: If that be not just or reasonable, then it is also unjust and unreasonable; for the sentence, and the execution of the sentence, are the same emanation and issue of justice, and are to be equally accounted of. For,

2. I demand, had it been just in *God* to damn all mankind to the eternal pains of Hell for *Adam's* sin, committed before they had a being, or could consent to it, or know of it? If it could be just, then any thing in the world can be just, and it is no matter who is innocent, or who is criminal directly and by choice, since they may turn devils in their mothers bellies; and it matters not, whether there be any laws or no, since it is all one that there be no law, and that we do not know whether there be or no; and it matters not whether there be any judicial process, for we may as well be damned without

judgment, as be guilty without action : and besides, all those arguments will press here, which I urged in my first discourse. Now if it had been unjust, actually to damn us all for the sin of one, it was unjust to sentence us to it; for if he did give sentence against us justly, he could justly have executed the sentence; and this is just, if that be. For,

3. God did put this sentence in execution; for if that be true which these learned men suppose, that by *Adam's* sin we fell into a damnable condition, but by Christ we are rescued from an actual damnation for it; then it will follow, that when he sent the Holy JESUS into the World to die for us, and to redeem us, he satisfied his Father's Anger for Original Sin, as well as for Actual; he paid for our share, as well as for *Adam's*; for our share of that sin which he committed, as well as for those which we committed and not he; he paid all the price of that, as well as of this damnation; and the horrible sentence was bought off, and God was so satisfied, that his justice had full measure for the damnation to which we stood liable. God, I say, had full measure for all; for so all men say, who speak the voice of the Church in the matter of Christ's satisfaction: So that now, although there was the goodness of God in taking the evil from us; yet how to reconcile this process with his justice, *viz.* That for the sin of another God should sentence all the World to the portion of Devils to eternal ages; and that he would not be reconciled to us, or take off this horrible sentence, without a full price to be paid to his justice by the Saviour of the World; *this* is it that I require may be reconciled to that Notion which we have of the Divine Justice.

4. If no man shall ever be damned for the sin of *Adam* alone, then I demand whether are they born quit from the guilt? or when are they quitted? If they be born free I agree to it: but then they were never charged with it, so far as to make them *liable to damnation*. If they be not born free, when are they quitted? By Baptism, before or after? He that says before or after, must speak wholly by chance, and without pretence of Scripture or Tradition, or any sufficient warrant; and he cannot guess when it is. If in Baptism he is quitted, then he that dies before Baptism, is still under the sentence, and what shall become of him? If it be answered, that God will pardon him some way or other, at some time or other; I reply, yea, but who said so?

For

For if the Scriptures have said that we are all in *Adam* guilty of sin and damnation, and the Scriptures have told us no ways of being quit of it, but by Baptism and Faith in Christ: Is it not plainly consequent, that till we believe in Christ, or at least till in the faith of others we are baptized into Christ, we are reckoned still in *Adam*, not in Christ, that is, still we are under damnation, and not heirs of Heaven, but of Wrath only.

5. How can any one bring himself into a belief that one can be damned for Original Sin, if he be of this persuasion, that it makes us liable to damnation; for if you say as I say, that it is against God's justice to damn us for the fault of another; then it is also against his justice to sentence us to that suffering, which to inflict, is injustice. If you say it is believed upon this account, because Christ was promised to mankind, I reply, that yet all mankind shall not be saved; and there are conditions required on our part; and no man can be saved but by Christ, and he must come to him, or be brought to him, or it is not told us, how any one can have a part in him; and therefore that will not give us the confidence is looked for. If it be at last said, that we hope in God's goodness, that he will take care of Innocents, and that they shall not perish; I answer, that if they be Innocents, we need not appeal to his goodness, for his justice will secure them. If they be guilty and not Innocents, then it is but vain to run to God's goodness, which in this particular is not revealed; when to condemn them, is not against his justice which is revealed; and to hope that God will save them whom he hates, who are gone from him in *Adam*, who are born heirs of his wrath, slaves of the Devil, servants of sin, (for these Epithets are given to all the Children of *Adam*, by the opponents in this Question) is to hope for that, against which his justice visibly is engaged, and for which hope there is no ground, unless this instance of Divine goodness were expressed in revelation; for so even wicked persons on their death-bed are bidden to hope without rule, and without reason or sufficient grounds of trust. But besides, that we hope in God's goodness in this case is not ill: But I ask, Is it against God's goodness that any one perish for Original Sin? If it be against God's goodness, it is also against his justice; for nothing is just, that is not also good. God's goodness may cause his justice to forbear a sentence; but whatsoever is against God's goodness, is

is against God, and therefore against his justice also; because every attribute in God, is God himself: For it is not always true, to say, [This is against God's goodness because, [the contradictory is agreeable to God's goodness:] Neither is it always false to say, that two contradictories may both be agreeable to God's goodness. God's goodness is of such a latitude, that it may take both parts of the contradiction: Contradictories cannot both be against God's goodness, but they may both be with it; whatsoever is against the goodness of God, essentially evil: But a thing may be agreeable to God's goodness, and yet the other part not be against it. For example, It is against the goodness of God, to hate fools and idiots; and therefore he can never hate them. But it is agreeable to God's goodness, to give Heaven to them, and the joys beatifical; and if he does not give them so much yet if he does no evil to them hereafter, it is also agreeable to his goodness: To give them Heaven, or not to give them Heaven, though they be contradictories, yet are both agreeable with his goodness. But in contraries the case is otherwise: For though not to give them Heaven is consistent with the Divine goodness, yet to send them to Hell is not. The reason of the difference is this. Because to do contrary things must come from contrary principles and whatsoever is contrary to the Divine goodness is essentially evil. But to do or not to do, supposes but one positive principle; and the other negative, not having a contrary cause, may be wholly innocent, as proceeding from a negative: But to speak more plain; Is it against God's goodness, that Infants should be damned for Original Sin? Then it could never have been done, it was essentially evil, and therefore could never be decreed or sentenced. But if it be not against God's goodness that they should perish in Hell, then it may consist with God's goodness; and then to hope that God's goodness will rescue them from his justice, when the thing may agree with both, is to hope without ground: God may be good though they perish for Adam's sin; and if so, and that he can be just too, upon the account of what attribute shall these Innocents be rescued, and we hope for mercy for them.

6. If *Adam's posterity* be only liable to damnation, but shall never be damned for *Adam's sin*, then all the Children of Heathens, dying in their Infancy, shall escape as well as baptized Christian Children: Which if any of my disagreeing Bre-

in
brethren sh
goodness, b
Church, w
will be han
ren have
or being b
may happe
en to the
their pr
aptized;
most certa
ould be
of God, as
affirmati
ut by af
condemn
ave prov
damnatio
Heathen
ness, thou
may fail
therefore
well foll
Heathen
follow at
were aga
in Adam
justice, a
affirm th
to assure
thens, ye
as there
principle
they are
fore, wit
Heathen
goodnes
7. Bu
men an
can be
probati
to his p
damna
ould b

brethren shall affirm, he will indeed seem to magnifie God's goodness, but must fall out with some great Doctors of the Church, whom he would pretend to follow; and besides, he will be hard put to it, to tell what advantage Christian Children have over Heathens, supposing them all to die young; or being bred up in the Christian Religion is accidental, and may happen to the children of unbelievers, or may not happen to the children of believers; and if Baptism adds nothing to their present state, there is no reason Infants should be baptized; but if it does add to their present capacity, (as most certainly it does very much) then that Heathen Infants should be in a condition of being rescued from the wrath of God, as well as Christian Infants, is a strange unlookt for affirmative, and can no way be justified or made probable, but by affirming it to be against the justice of God, to condemn any for *Adam's* sin. Indeed if it be unjust, (as I have proved it is) then it will follow, that none shall suffer damnation by it. But if the hopes of the salvation of Heathen Infants be to be derived only from God's goodness, though God's goodness cannot fail, yet our Argument may fail: For it will not follow, because God is good, therefore Heathen Infants shall be saved; for it might as well follow, God is good, therefore Heathens shall be no Heathens, but all turn Christians; these things do not follow affirmatively, but negatively they do. For if it were against God's goodness, that they should be reckoned in *Adam* unto eternal death, then it is also against his justice, and against God all the way; and then they who affirm they were so reckoned, must shew some revelation to assure us, that though it be just in God to damn all Heathens, yet that he is so good that he will not. For so long as there is no revelation of any such goodness, there is this principle to contest against it, I mean, their affirming that they are in *Adam* justly liable to damnation: And therefore, without disparagement to the infinite goodness of God, Heathen Infants may perish; for it is never against God's goodness to throw a sinner into Hell.

7. But to come yet closer to the Question, some good men and wise suppose, that the *Sublapsarian* Presbyterians can be confuted in their pretended grounds of absolute Reprobation, although we grant that *Adam's* sin is damnable to his posterity; provided that we say that though it was damnable, yet it shall never damn us. Now though I wish it could be done, that they and I might not differ so much as in

in a circumstance; yet first it is certain, that the men that speak of can never be confuted upon the stock of God's Justice: Because, as the one says, It is just that God should actually damn all for the sin of *Adam*: So the other says, It is just that God should actually sentence all to damnation; and so there the case is equal. Secondly, they cannot be confuted upon the stock of God's Goodness, because the emanations of that are wholly arbitrary; and though there are negative measures of it, as there is of God's Infinity, and we know God's goodness to be inconsistent with some things, yet there are no positive measures of this goodness; and no man can tell how much it will do for us: And therefore without a revelation, things may be sometimes hoped for which yet may not be presumed; and therefore here all they are not to be confuted: And as for the particular Scriptures, unless we have the advantage of essential reason taken from the Divine Attributes, they will oppose Scripture to Scripture, and have as much advantage to expound the opposite places, as the *Jews* have in the Questions of the *Messias*; and therefore, *si meos ipse corymbos necterem*, if I might make my own Arguments in the Society, and with their leave, I would upon that very account suspect the usual discourses of the effects and economy of Original Sin.

8. For where will they reckon the beginning of Predestination? Will they reckon it in *Adam* after the Fall, or in Christ immediately promised? If in *Adam*, then the return to the *Presbyterian* way, and run upon all the rock before reckoned, enough to break all the World in pieces. If in Christ they reckon it, (and so they do) then thus I argue: If we are all reckoned in Christ before we were born, then how can we be reckoned in *Adam* when we are born? I speak as to the matter of Predestination to Salvation or Damnation:) For as for the intermedial temporal evils, and dangers spiritual, and sad infirmities, they are our nature, and might with justice have been all the portion God had given to *Adam*, and therefore they may be so to us; and consequently, not at all to be reckoned in this enquiry. But certainly, as to the main,

9. If God looks upon us all in Christ, then by him we are rescued from *Adam*, so much is done for us before we were born. For if this is not to be reckoned till after we were born, then *Adam's* sin prevailed really in some periods, and to some effects, for which God in Christ has

provided no remedy; for he gave no remedy to children after they were born, but irremediably they were born children of wrath; but if a remedy were given to children before they were born, then they are born in Christ, not in *Adam*: But if this remedy was not given to Children before they were born, then it follows, that we were not at first looked upon in Christ, but in *Adam*; and consequently he was *caput predestinationis*, the head of predestination; or else there were two, the one before we were born, the other after. So that *heret lethalis arundo*, the arrow sticks fast, and it cannot be pulled out, unless by other instruments than are commonly in fashion. However it be, yet methinks this is a very good probable Argument.

As *Adam* sinned before any child was born, so was Christ promised before; and that our Redeemer should not have more force upon children, that they should be born beloved, and quitted from wrath, than *Adam* our Progenitor shall have to cause that they be born hated, and in a damnable condition; wants so many degrees of probability, that it seems to dishonour the mercy of God, and the reputation of his goodness, and the power of his redemption.

For this serves as an Antidote, and Antinomy of their great objection pretended by these learned persons: For whereas they say, they the rather affirm this, because it is an honour to the redemption which our Saviour wrought for us, that it rescued us from the sentence of damnation which we had incurred. To this I say, that the honour of our blessed Saviour does no way depend upon our imaginations and weak propositions: and neither can the reputation and honour of the Divine goodness borrow aids and artificial supports from the dishonour of his Justice; and it is no reputation to a Physician, to say he hath cured us of an evil which we never had: And shall we accuse the Father of Mercies to have wounded us, for no other reason, but that the Son may have the Honour to have cured us? I understand not that. He that makes a necessity that he may find a remedy, is like the *Roman* whom *Cato* found fault withal, he would commit a fault, that he might beg a pardon, he had rather write bad Greek, than he might make an apology, than write good Latin, and need none. But however, Christ hath done enough for us, even all that we did need; and since it is all

all the reason in the world we should pay him all honour we may remember, that it is a greater favour to us that by the benefit of our blessed Saviour, who was the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world, we were reckoned in Christ, and born in the accounts of the Divine favour; I say it is a greater favour, that we were born under the redemption of Christ, than under the sentence and damnation of *Adam*, and to prevent an evil is a greater favour than to cure it: So that if, to do honour to God's goodness and to the graces of our Redeemer, we will suppose a need, we may do him more honour to suppose, that the promised seed of the woman did do us as early a good, as the sin of *Adam* could do us mischief; and therefore that in Christ we are born acquitted from any such supposed sentence, and not that we bring it upon our shoulders into the world with us. But this thing relies only upon their suppositions.

For if we will speak of what is really true, and plainly revealed; from all the sins of all mankind, Christ came to redeem us; he came to give us a supernatural birth, to tell us all his Father's will, to reveal to us those glorious promises, upon the expectation of which, we might be enabled to do every thing that is required: He came to bring us grace, and life, and spirit; to strengthen us against all the powers of Hell and Earth; to sanctify our afflictions, which from *Adam* by Natural generation descended on us; to take out the sting of death, to make it an entrance to immortal life; to assure us of resurrection to intercede for us, and to be an advocate for us, when we by infirmity commit sin; to pardon us when we repent. Nothing of which could be derived to us from *Adam*, by our Natural generation. Mankind now taken in his whole constitution and design, is like the Birds of *Paradise*, which Travellers tell us of in the *Molucco Islands*, born without legs; but by a celestial power they have a recompence made to them for that defect, and they always hover in the air, and feed on the dew of Heaven. So are we Birds of *Paradise*, but cast out from thence; and born without legs, without strength to walk in the Laws of God, or to go to Heaven; but by a power from above, we are adopted in our new birth, to a celestial conversation; we feed on the dew of Heaven, *The just does live by faith*, and breaths in this new life by the spirit of God. For from the first *Adam* nothing descended to us but an infirm

firm bod
of death,
eld, a ca
ul natu
ody, and
and thou
atural ab
erent mi
ation. I
by his Gr
Death, b
Promises
his Ascen
And if thi
enough to
ices, an
am fur
eed, of
much do
ould as
No
A
V
F
The mea
gence, w

For thus
Change
Saviour
true wh
of sin, an
Birth of
of our r
the fou
Adam,
North, a
well as
cause if
infirm

firm body, and a naked soul, evil example, and a body of death, ignorance and passion, hard labour and a cursed field, a captive soul and an imprisoned body; that is, a soul naturally apt to comply with the appetites of the body, and its desires, whether reasonable or excessive: And though these things were not direct sins to us in their natural abode and first principle, yet they are proper inherent miseries and principles of sin to us in their emanation. But from this state Christ came to redeem us all by his Grace, and by his Spirit, by his Life and by his Death, by his Doctrine and by his Sacraments, by his Promises and by his Revelations, by his Resurrection and his Ascension, by his Interceding for us and Judging of us. And if this be not a conjugation of glorious things great enough to amaze us, and to merit from us all our services, and all our Love, and all the glorifications of God, I am sure nothing can be added to it, by any supposed need, of which we have no revelation: There is as much done for us as we could need, and more than we could ask;

*Nempe quod optanti divum promittere nemo
Auderet, voluenda dies en attulit ultro!
Vivite felices anima quibus est fortuna peracta
Jam sua -----*

The meaning of which words I render, or at least recommend, with the verse of a Psalm:

*To thee, O Lord, I'll pay my vow,
My knees in thanks to thee shall bow;
For thou my life keep'st from the grave;
And dost my feet from falling save,
That with the living in thy sight
I may enjoy eternal light.*

*Psal. 56. by
Bp. King.*

For thus what *Abasuerus* said to *Esther*, *Veteres literas muta*, Change the old letters, is done by the Birth of our Blessed Saviour; *Eva* is changed into *Ave*: And although it be true what *Bensirach* said, *From the woman is the beginning of sin, and by her we all die*; yet it is now changed by the Birth of our Redeemer; From a woman is the beginning of our restitution, and in him we all live: Thus are all the four quarters of the World renewed by the second Adam, *Ἀνατολή, Δύσις, Ἀρχὴ, Μικροβεία*, the East, West, North, and South, are represented in the second Adam as well as the first; and rather, and to better purposes, because if sin did abound, grace shall superabound.

I have

I have now (Madam) given you such accounts, as I hope, being added to my other Papers, may satisfy not only your Ladyship, but those to whom this account may be communicated. I shall only now beg your patience, since you have been troubled with questions and enquiries, and objections, and little murmurs; to hear my answers to such of them as have been brought to me.

1. I am complained of, that I would trouble the World with a new thing; which let it be never so true, yet unless it were very useful, will hardly make recompence for the trouble I put the World to, in this enquiry.

I answer, that for the newness of it, I have already given accounts, that the Opinions which I impugn, are they are no direct parts of the Article of Original Sin, but they are newer than the truth which I have asserted. But let what I say seem as new as the Reformation did, when Luther first preached against Indulgences, the pretence of Novelty did not, and we say, ought not to have affrighted him; and therefore I ought also to look to what I say, that it be true, and the truth will prove its age. But to speak freely, (Madam) though I have a great reverence for Antiquity, yet it is the prime Antiquity of the Church, the Ages of Martyrs and Holiness that I mean, and I am sure, that in them my opinion hath much more warrant, than the contrary: But for the descending Ages, I give that veneration to the great Names of them that went before us, which themselves gave to their Predecessors; I honour their Memory, I read their Books, I imitate their Piety, I examine their Arguments; for therefore did they write them: And where the reasons of the Moderns and theirs seem equal, turn the balance of the elder side, and follow them; but where a scruple or a grain of reason is evidently in the other balance, I must follow that: *Nempe qui ante nos ista moverunt, non Domini nostri, sed duces sunt*, Seneca Ep. 33. They that taught of this Article before me, are good guides but no Lords and Masters; for I must acknowledge none upon earth, for so I am commanded by my Lord and Master that is in Heaven: And I remember what we were taught in *Palatinus* genius, when we were boys;

*Quicquid Aristoteles, vel quivis dicat eorum,
Dicta nihil moror, à vero cum fortè recedunt:
Sæpe graves magnosque viros, famâque verendos,
Errare & labi contingit; plurima secum*

Ingenium

*Ingenia in tenebras consueti nominis alti
Authores ubi connivent, deducere easdem.*

If *Aristotle* be deceiv'd, and say that's true,
What nor himself nor others ever knew,
I leave his text, and let his Scholars talk
Till they be hoarse, or weary in their walk:
When wise men err, tho' their fame ring like Bells,
I 'scape a danger when I leave their spells.

For although they that are dead some Ages before we were born, have a reverence due to them, yet more is due to Truth, that shall never die; and God is not wanting to our industry, any more than to theirs, but blesses every Age with the understanding of his truths. *Ætatibus omnibus, omnibus hominibus communis sapientia est, nec illam seu peculium licet antiquitati gratulari*; all ages, and all men have their advantages in their enquiries after truth, neither is wisdom appropriate to our fathers. And because even wise men may be deceived, and therefore that when I find it, or suppose it so, (for that's all one, as to me and my duty) I must go after truth, where-ever it is. Certainly it will be less expected for me to follow the popular notions, and the voices of the people, who are not to teach us, but to be taught by us: And I believe my self to have reason to complain, when men are angry at a doctrine, because it is not commonly taught; that is, when they are impatient to be taught a truth, because most men do already believe a lie. *Recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus factus est*; so *Seneca* (*Epist.* 123.) complained in his time: It is a strange title to truth, which error can pretend, for its being public; and we refuse to follow an unusual truth, *quasi honestius sit quia frequentius*; and indeed it were well to do so in those propositions which have no truth in them, but what they borrow from men's opinions, and are for nothing tolerable, but that they are usual.

Object. 2. But what necessity is there for my publication of this doctrine, supposing it were true; for all truths are not to be spoken at all times; and if a truth gives offence, it is better to let men alone, than to disturb the peace.

I answer with the labouring man's Proverb; a Pennyworth of Ease is worth a Penny at any time; and a little Truth is worth a little Peace every day of the week:

C

and,

and, *ceteris paribus*, Truth is to be preferred before Peace not every trifling truth to a considerable peace: But if the truth be material, it makes recompence, though it bring a great noise along with it; and if the breach of peace be nothing but that men talk in private, or declaim a little in publick; truly (Madam) it is a very pitiful little proposition, the discovery of which in truth will not make recompence for the prating of disagreeing persons. Truth and Peace make an excellent yoke, but the *truth of God* is always to be preferred before the *peace of men*, and therefore our Blessed Saviour came *not to send Peace but a Sword*; that is, he knew his doctrine would cause great divisions of heart, but yet he came to persuade us to Peace and Unity. Indeed if the truth be clear, and yet of no great effect in the lives of men, in government or in the honour of God, then it ought not to break the peace: That is, it may not run out of its retirement, and disquiet them, to whom their rest is better than that knowledge. But if it be brought out already, it must not be deserted positively, though peace goes away in its stead. So that Peace is rather to be *deserted*, than any Truth should be *renounced* or *denied*: but Peace is rather to be *procured* or *continued*, than some Truth offered. This is my fence, (Madam) when the case is otherwise than I suppose it to be at present. For as for the present case, there must be two when there is a falling out, or peace broken; and therefore I will secure it now: For let any man dissent from me in this Article, I will not be troubled at him; he may do it with liberty, and with much charity. If any man is of my opinion, I confess I love him the better; but if he refuses it, I will not love him less after than I did before: But he that dissents, and reviles me, must expect from me no other kindness but that I forgive him, and pray for him, and offer to reclaim him; and that I resolve nothing shall ever make me either hate him, or reproach him: And that still in the greatest of his difference, I refuse not to give him the communion of a Brother. I believe I shall be chided by some or other for my easiness, and want of fierceness which they call Zeal; but it is a fault of my nature, part of my Original Sin:

*Unicuique dedit vitium natura creato,
Mi Natura aliquid semper amare dedit.* Propert.

Son

*Some weakness to each man by birth descends,
To me too great a kindness Nature lends.*

But if the peace can be broken no more than thus, I suppose the truth which I publish, will do more than make recompence for the noise that in Clubs and Conventicles is made over and above. So long as I am thus resolved, there may be injury done to me, but there can be no duel, or loss of Peace abroad. For a single anger, or a displeasure on one side, is not a breach of Peace on both; and a War cannot be made by fewer, than a Bargain can, in which always there must be two at least.

Object. 3. But as to the thing, If it be enquired, *τις λόγος οὖν οἰκονομίαν χρεῖται*; what profit, what use, what edification is there, what good to souls, what honour to God, by this new explication of the Article? I answer, That the usual Doctrines of Original Sin are made the great foundation of the horrible proposition concerning absolute Reprobation; the consequences of it reproach God with injustice, they charge God foolishly, and deny his goodness and his wisdom, in many instances: And whatsoever can, upon the account of the Divine Attributes, be objected against the fierce way of Absolute Decrees; all that can be brought for the reproof of their usual Propositions concerning Original Sin. For the consequences are plain; and by them the necessity of my Doctrine, and its usefulness, may be understood.

For, 1. If God decrees us to be born sinners, then he makes us to be sinners; and then where is his Goodness?

2. If God does damn any for that, he damns us for what we could not help, and for what himself did; and then where is his Justice?

3. If God sentences us to that Damnation, which he cannot in justice inflict, where is his Wisdom?

4. If God for the sin of *Adam* brings upon us a necessity of sinning; where is our Liberty? where is our Nature? what is become of all Laws, and of all Vertue and Vice? how can Men be distinguished from Beasts, or the virtuous from the vicious?

5. If by the fall of *Adam* we are so wholly ruined in our faculties, that we cannot do any good, but must do evil; how shall any man take care of his ways? or how can it be supposed he should strive against all vice? when he can excuse so much upon his Nature? or indeed how

The Divine Goodness and Justice

shall he strive at all ? For if all Actual sins are derived from the Original, and which is an unavoidable, and yet an irresistible cause, then no man can take care to avoid any actual sin, whose cause is natural, and not to be declined; and then, where is his Providence and Government?

6. If God does cast Infants into Hell for the sin of others, and yet did not condemn Devils, but for their own sin; where is his Love to Mankind?

7. If God chuses the death of so many millions of persons who are no sinners upon their own stock, and yet swears that he doth not love the death of a sinner, viz. sinning with his own choice; how can that be credible he should love to kill Innocents, and yet should love to spare the Criminal? where then is his Mercy, and where is his Truth?

8. If God hath given us a Nature by derivation, which is wholly corrupted, then how can it be that all which God made is good? For though *Adam* corrupted himself, yet in propriety of speaking, we did not; but this was the Decree of God; and then where is the excellency of his Providence and Power, where is the Glory of the Creation?

Because therefore that God is all *goodness*, and *justice*, and *wisdom*, and *love*, and that he governs all things, and all men wisely and holily, and according to the capacities of their Natures and Persons; that he gives us a wise Law, and binds that Law on us by promises and threatnings: I had reason to assert these glories of the Divine Majesty, and remove the hindrances of a good life; since every thing can hinder us from living well, but scarcely can all the Arguments of God and man, and all the powers of Heaven and Hell, persuade us to strictness and severity.

Qui serere ingenuum volet agrum,

Liberet arva prius fruticibus

Falce rubos, silicemque refecet,

Ut novâ fruge gravis Ceres eat. Boeth. l. 3. met. 1.

He that will sow his field with hopeful seed,
Must every Bramble, every Thistle weed;
And when each hindrance to the Grain is gone,
A fruitful crop shall rise of Corn alone.

When therefore there were so many ways made to the Devil, I was willing, amongst many others, to stop the

also; and
say half
necessity
I know
do and
do all th
do follow
men tha
think th
opinions
arise. I
horrid
and upo
those D
disown
and yet
own the
Men be
the evil
yet fro
there ar
is evil i
in the e
take to
Object
why ar
them b
I an
And it
ham ci
remissio
rities, a
sacrifice
away f
that no
This C
Christ
hoved
regener
Childr
death,
therefo
anew,
Christ

also; and I dare say, few Questions in Christendom can say half so much in justification of their own usefulness and necessity.

I know (Madam) that they who are of the other side do and will disavow most of these consequences; and so do all the World, all the evils which their adversaries say, do follow from their opinions; but yet all the World of men that perceive such evils to follow from a proposition, think themselves bound to stop the progression of such opinions, from whence they believe such evils may arise. If the Church of *Rome* did believe that all those horrid things were chargeable upon Transubstantiation, and upon worshipping of Images, which we charge upon those Doctrines, I do not doubt but they would as much disown the propositions, as now they do the consequents; and yet I do as little doubt, but that we do well to disown the first, because we espy the latter: And though the Men be not, yet the Doctrines are highly chargeable with the evils that follow: It may be the men espy them not, yet from the doctrines they do certainly follow; and there are not in the World many men who own that which is evil in the pretence, but many do such as are dangerous in the effect; and this doctrine which I have reproved, I take to be one of them.

Object. 4. But if Original sin be not a sin properly, why are children baptized? And what benefit comes to them by Baptism?

I answer, As much as they need, and are capable of: And it may as well be asked, Why were the sons of *Abraham* circumcised, when in the Covenant there was no remission of sins at all? For little things, and legal impurities, and irregularities there were; but there being no sacrifice there but of Beasts, whose blood could not take away sin, it is certain and plainly taught us in Scripture, that no Rite of *Moses* was expiatory of sins. But secondly, This Objection can press nothing at all; for why was Christ baptized, who knew no sin? But yet so it behoved him to fulfil all Righteousness. 3. Baptism is called *regeneration*, or the *new birth*; and therefore since in *Adam* Children are born only to a natural life and a natural death, and by this they can never arrive at Heaven; therefore Infants are baptized, because, until they be born anew, they can never have title to the Promises of Jesus Christ, or be heirs of Heaven, and co-heirs of Jesus.

* *Vide Aug. de Gen. lib. 1. de Nat. & Grat. c. 21. Opus imperf. in Julian. l. 1. c. 54. & lib. de Peccat. Orig. c. 21.*

4. By Baptism Children are made partakers of the Holy Ghost, and of the Grace of God; which I desire to be observed, in opposition to the *Pelagian* Heresie, who did suppose Nature to be so perfect, * that the Grace of God was not necessary, and that by Nature alone, they could go to Heaven; which because I affirm to be impossible, and that Baptism is therefore necessary, because Nature is insufficient, and Baptism is the great channel of grace; there ought to be no envious and ignorant load laid upon my Doctrine, as if it complied with the *Pelagian*, against which it is so essentially and so mainly opposed in the main difference of his Doctrine. 5. Children are therefore Baptized, because if they live they will sin, and though their sins are not pardoned before-hand, yet in Baptism they are admitted to that state of favour, that they are within the Covenant of Repentance and Pardon: And this is expressly the Doctrine of *S. Austin, lib. 1. de nupt. & concup. cap. 26. & cap. 33. & tract. 124. in Johan.* But of this I have already given larger accounts in my Discourse of Baptism, Part 2. p. 194. in the *Great Exemplar*. 6. Children are Baptized for the Pardon even of Original Sin; this may be affirmed truly, but yet improperly: for so far as it is imputed, so far also it is remissible; for the evil that is done by *Adam*, is also taken away in *Christ*; and it is imputed to us to very evil purposes, as I have elsewhere explicated: but as it was among the *Jews*, who belieyed then the sin to be taken away, when the evil of punishment is taken off; so is Original Sin taken away in Baptism; for though the Material part of the evil is not taken away, yet the curse in all the sons of God is turned into a blessing, and is made an occasion of reward, or an entrance to it. Now in all this I affirm all that is true, and all that is probable: for in the same sense, as Original stain is a sin, so does Baptism bring the Pardon. It is a sin metonymically, that is, because it is the effect of one sin; and the cause of many; and just so in Baptism it is taken away, that it is now the matter of a grace, and the opportunity of glory; and upon these Accounts the Church Baptizes all her Children.

Object. 5. But to deny Original Sin to be a sin properly and inherently, is expressly against the words of *S. Paul*, in the fifth Chapter to the *Romans*; *If it be, I have done; but that it is not, I have these things to say.*

1. If the words be capable of any interpretation, and can be

be pern
rended,
why th
violence
and the
jected,
and all

2. T
[condem
lesser se
and [A
and [A
could n
proved
used,
it is so
mon. 3
himself
Apostle
men ha
eterna
eternal
sin; b
those v
they a
then it
from
upon t
die n
puted;
to suc
death
to ete
Apost
by the
"Pro
"in
"Scr
"Ear
"ren
"ab
"rec
"his
"the

be permitted to signifie otherwise than is vulgarly pretended, I suppose my self to have given reasons sufficient, why they ought to be. For any interpretation that does violence to right Reason, to Religion, to Holiness of life, and the Divine Attributes of God, is therefore to be rejected, and another chosen; for in all Scriptures, all good and all wise men do it.

2. The words in question, [*sin*] and [*sinner*] and [*condemnation*] are frequently used in Scripture in the lesser sence, and [*sin*] is taken for the punishment of *sin*; and [*sin*] is taken for him who bore the evil of the *sin*; and [*sin*] is taken for legal impurity; and for him who could not be guilty, even for Christ himself; as I have proved already: And in the like manner [*sinners*] is used, by the rule of conjugates and denominatives; but it is so also in the case of *Bathsheba* the Mother of *Solomon*. 3. For the word [*condemnation*], it is by the Apostle himself limited to signifie temporal death; for when the Apostle says, [*Death passed upon all men, in as much as all men have sinned*]; he must mean *temporal death*; for eternal death did not pass upon all men; or if he means *eternal death*, he must not mean that it came for *Adam's sin*; but *in as much as all men have sinned*; that is, upon all those upon whom eternal death did come, it came because they also have sinned. For if it had come for *Adam's sin*, then it had absolutely descended upon all men; because from *Adam* all men descended; and therefore all men upon that account were equally guilty: as we see all men die naturally. 4. The Apostle here speaks of *sin imputed*; therefore not of *sin inherant*: and if imputed only to such purposes as he here speaks of, *viz.* to temporal death, then it is neither a *sin properly*, nor yet imputable to eternal death, so far as is or can be implied by the Apostle's words. And in this I am not a little confirmed, by the discourse of *S. Irenaeus* to this purpose, *lib.3. cap.35.* "*Propter hoc & initio transgressionis Ada, &c.* Therefore in the beginning of *Adam's transgression*, (as the Scripture tells us, God did not curse *Adam*, but the Earth in his labours; as one of the Ancients saith, God removed the curse upon the Earth, that it might not abide on Man. But the condemnation of his sin he received, weariness and labour, and to eat in the sweat of his brows, and to return to dust again: and likewise the woman had for her punishment, tediousness, labours,

1 Kings,

1. 21.

Zech. 14.

19.

2 Cor. 5. 21.

Isa. 53. 10.

Heb. 9. 28.

1 Kings,

1. 21.

" groans, sorrows of child-birth, and to serve her husband;
 " band; that they might not wholly perish in the curse
 " nor yet despise God, while they remained without punishment.
 " nishment. But all the curse ran upon the Serpent
 " who seduced them, --- and thus our Lord in the Gospel
 " saith to them on his left hand, Go ye cursed into
 " everlasting fire, which my Father prepared for the Devil
 " and his Angels: signifying, that not for man, in the
 " prime intention, was eternal fire prepared; but to him
 " who was the seducer --- but this they also shall justly
 " feel, who like them, without repentance and departing
 " from them, persevere in the works of malice. 5. The
 Apostle says; *By the disobedience of one, many were made*
sinners: By which it appears, that we in this have no
 sin of our own, neither is it all our own *formally* and *in-*
herently; for though efficiently it was his, and effectively
 ours, as to certain purposes of imputation, yet it could
 not be a sin to us formally; because it was *unius inobe-*
dientia, the disobedience of one man, therefore in no
 sense could it be *properly* ours. For then it was not *unius*,
 but *inobedientia singulorum*, the disobedience of all men,
 6. Whensoever another man's sin is imputed to his rela-
 tive, therefore because it is another's, and imputed, it
 can go no farther, but to effect certain evils, to afflict the
 relative, and to punish the cause; not formally to deno-
 minate the descendant or relative to be a sinner; for it is
 as much a contradiction to say that I am formally by him
 a sinner, as that I did really do his action. Now [*to*
impute] in Scripture, signifies to reckon as if he had done
 it; *not to impute*, is to treat him so as if he had not done
 it. So far then as the imputation is, so far are we reck-
 oned as sinners; but *Adam's* sin being by the Apostle signi-
 fied to be imputed but to the condemnation or sentence
 to a temporal death, so far we are sinners in him; that
 is, so as that for his sake death was brought upon us;
 and indeed the word [*imputare*, to impute] does never
 signify more, nor always so much. *Imputare vero fre-*
quenter ad significationem exprobrantis accedit, sed citra
reprehensionem, says *Laurentius Valla*, it is like an expro-
 bration, but short of a reproof: so *Quintilian*, *Imputas*
nobis propitios ventos, & secundum mare, ac civitatis opu-
lenta liberalitatem; thou dost impute, that is, upbraid to
 us our prosperous voyages, and a calm Sea, and the libe-
 rality of a rich City. *Imputare* signifies oftentimes the
 same

same that *computare*, to reckon or account; *Nam hæc in quartâ non imputantur*, say the Lawyers, they are not imputed; that is, they are not computed or reckoned. Thus Adam's sin is imputed to us, that is, it is put into our reckoning; and when we are sick and die, we pay our Symbols, the portion of evil that is laid upon us: And what *Marcus* said, I may say in this case, with a little variety, *Legata in hereditate ----- sive legatum datum sit heredi, sive percipere, sive deducere vel retinere passus est, ei imputantur*; the legacy whether given or left to the heir, whether he may take it or keep it, is still imputed to him; that is, *it is within his reckoning*.

But no Reason, no Scripture, no Religion does enforce, and no Divine Attribute does permit, that we should say that God did so impute Adam's sin to his posterity, that he did really esteem them to be guilty of Adam's sin; equally culpable, equally hateful: For if in this sense it be true that in him we sinned; then we sinned as he did, that is, with the same malice, in the same action; and then we are as much guilty as he: But if we have sinned less, then we did not *sin in him*; for to sin in him, could not by him be lessened to us; for what we did in him we did by him, and therefore as much as he did: But if God imputed this sin less to us than to him, then this imputation supposes it only to be a collateral and indirect account to such purposes as he pleased; of which purposes we judge by the analogy of Faith, by the words of Scripture, by the proportion and notices of the Divine Attributes.

7. There is nothing in the design or purpose of the Apostle, that can or ought to infer any other thing; for his purpose is, to signify, that by man's sin death entered into the world; which the son of *Sirach*, *Ecclus. 25. 23.* expresses thus; *A muliere factum est initium peccati, & inde est quod morimur*; from the woman is the beginning of sin, and from her it is that we all die: and again, *Ecclus. 1. 24.* *By the envy of the devil death came into the world*; this evil being universal, Christ came into the world, and became our head, to other purposes, even to redeem us from death; which he hath begun, and will finish; and to become to us our Parent in a new birth, the Author of a spiritual life; and this benefit is of far more efficacy in Christ, than the evil could be by Adam: And as by Adam we are made sinners, so by Christ are we made righteous; not just so, but so and more; and therefore

as

as our being made sinners, signifies that by him we die; so being by Christ made righteous, must at least signify that by him we live: And this is so evident to them who read S. Paul's words, *Rom. 5.* from *verse 12.* to *verse 19.* inclusively, that I wonder any man should make a farther question concerning them; especially since *Eraſmus* and *Grotius*, who are to be reckoned amongst the greatest, and best expositors of Scripture, that any age since the Apostles and their immediate successors have brought forth, have so understood and rendred it. But Madam, that your Honour may read the words and their sense together, and see that without violence they signify what I have said, and no more; I have here subjoined a Paraphrase of them, in which if I use any violence, it can very easily be reproved.

Rom. 5. 12. As by one man sin entred into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned: i. e.

As by the disobedience of *Adam* sin had its beginning, and by sin death; that is, the sentence and preparations, the solemnities and addresses of death, sickness, calamity, diminution of strength, old age, misfortunes, and all the affections of mortality, for the destroying of our temporal life; and so this mortality, and condition or state of death passed actually upon all mankind; for *Adam* being thrown out of *Paradise*, and forced to live with his Children where they had no Trees of Life, as he had in *Paradise*, was remanded to his mortal, natural state; and therefore death passed upon them, mortally seized on all, *for that all have sinned*; that is, the sin was reckoned to all, not to make them guilty like *Adam*; but *Adam's* sin passed upon all, imprinting this real calamity on us all: But yet death descended also upon *Adam's* posterity for their own sins; for since all did sin, all should die. "But some Greek copies leave out the second *εἰς*, which indeed seems superfluous, and of no signification: but then the sense clearer; and the following words are the second part of a similitude: *As by one man sin entred into the world, and death by sin; so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.* But *εἰς* signifies neutrally: and the meaning is, as *Adam* died in his own sin, so death passed upon all men for their own sin; in the sin which they sinned, in that sin they died: As it did at first to *Adam*, by whom sin first entred, and

in
by sin de
fin passe
fin shoul
all did f
(even u
Adam's
as appe
pound
Adam;
this is l
harsh a
yet if i
of *Ada*
we are
for by l
mortal
13. Fo
imp
And m
mankind
appendar
of death
enough;
publicat
personal
For Nat
to penal
for *Ada*
pleased
also in
disposed
commu
the Lav
God ha
had th
upon t
14.
o
w
And
Moses,
that a
given
by

by sin death; so death passed upon all men upon whom sin passed: that is, in the same method, they who did sin should die. But then he does not seem to say that all did sin: for he presently subjoins, *that death reigned (even upon those who did not sin) after the similitude of Adam's transgression*; but this was upon another account as appears in the following words. But others expound *ἐφ' ὃ* to signifie masculinely, and to relate to *Adam*; viz. that in him we all sinned. Now although this is less consonant to the mind of the Apostle, and is harsh and improper both in the language and the sense, yet if it were so, it could mean but this, that the sin of *Adam* was of universal obligation; and in him we are reckoned as sinners, obnoxious to his sentence; for by his sin Humane Nature was reduced to its own mortality.

13. *For until the law, sin was in the world, but sin is not imputed where there is no law,*

And marvel not that Death did presently descend on all mankind, even before a Law was given them with an appendant penalty; viz. with the express intermination of death; for they did do actions unnatural and vile enough; but yet these things which afterwards, upon the publication of the Law were imputed to them upon their personal account, even unto death, *were not yet so imputed*. For Nature alone gives rules, but does not directly bind to penalties. But death came upon them before the Law, for *Adam's* sin; for with him God, being angry, was pleased to curse him also in his posterity, and leave them also in their mere natural condition; to which yet they disposed themselves, and had deserved but too much, by committing evil things; to which things, although before the Law, death was not threatned, yet for the anger which God had against mankind, he left that death which he had threatned to *Adam* expressly, by implication, to fall upon the posterity.

14. *Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, (even over them that had not sinned) after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him which was to come.*

And therefore it was that death reigned from *Adam* to *Moses*, from the first Law to the second; from the time that a Law was given to *one man*, till the time a Law was given to *one nation*; and although men had not sinned so grievously

grievously as *Adam* did, who had no excuse, many help excellent endowments, mighty advantages, trifling temptations, communication with God himself, no disorder in his faculties, free will, perfect immunity from violence, original righteousness, perfect power over his faculties; yet those men, such as *Abel* and *Seth*, *Noah* and *Abraham*, *Isaac* and *Jacob*, *Joseph* and *Benjamin*, who sinned less, and in the midst of all their disadvantages, were left to fall under the same sentence. But it is to be observed, that these words, [*even over them that had not sinned,*] according to some interpretations, are to be put into a parenthesis, and the following words, [*after the similitude of Adam's transgression,*] are an ὑμῶν, and to be referred to the first words, thus, death reigned from *Adam* to *Moses*,--- after the similitude of *Adam's* transgression; that is, as it was at first, so was it afterwards: death reigned upon men (who had not sinned) after the similitude of *Adam's* transgression; that is, like as it did in the transgression of *Adam*, so did it afterward; they in their innocence died, as *Adam* did in his sin and prevarication, and this was in the similitude of *Adam*: As they who obtain salvation, obtain it in the similitude of Christ, or by a conformity to Christ; so they who die, do die in the likeness of *Adam*; Christ and *Adam* being the two representatives of mankind: For this, besides that it was the present economy of the Divine Providence and Government, it did also like *Janus* look πρὸς τὸ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ ὀπίσσω, it looked forwards as well as backwards, and became a type of Christ, or of him that was to come. For as from *Adam* evil did descend upon his natural Children, upon the account of God's intercourse with *Adam*; so did good descend upon the spiritual Children of the second *Adam*.

15. But not as the offence, so also is the free gift: for if through the offence of one many be dead, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many.

This should have been the latter part of a similitude; but upon farther consideration, it is found, that as in *Adam* we die, so in Christ we live, and much rather, and much more; and therefore I cannot say, as by one man [vers. 12.] so by one man [vers. 15.] but much more; for not as the offence, so also is the free gift; for the offence of one did run over unto many, and those many even as it were all,

in
all, except
adventure
that acco
threw mer
dance: h
tion, in th
thousands
tions, and
a compar
river her
no argum
and Chr
humane
is done
God.

16. A

for

fre

And

for the

Ἰδὲ πρὸς

was im

given fi

lication

that th

in natu

sinned

fore th

was th

for the

But in

Christ

fall in

we w

shoul

the co

17.

Al

effica

For

all, except *Enoch*, or some very few more, of whom peradventure mention is not made, are already dead upon that account; but when God comes by *Jesus Christ* to shew mercy to mankind, he does it in much more abundance: he may be angry to the third and fourth generation, in them that hate him, but he will shew mercy unto thousands of them that love him; to a thousand generations, and in ten thousand degrees: So that now although a comparison proportionate was at first intended, yet the river here rises far higher than the fountain. And now no argument can be drawn from the similitude of *Adam* and *Christ*, but that as much hurt as was done to humane nature by *Adam's* sin, so very much more good is done to mankind by the incarnation of the Son of God.

16. *And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift; for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offences unto justification.*

And the first disparity and excess is in this particular; for the judgment was, *δι' ἑνὸς ἀναστήσαντος*, and *ἐξ ἑνὸς ἁμαρτίας*, by one man sinning one sin; that one sin was imputed; but by *Christ*, not only one sin was forgiven freely, but many offences were remitted unto justification: And secondly, a vast disparity there is in this; that the descendants from *Adam* were perfectly like him in nature, his own real natural production, and they sinned (though not so bad, yet) very much; and therefore there was a great parity of reason, that the evil which was threatned to *Adam*, and not to his Children, should yet for the likeness of nature and of sin, descend upon them. But in the other part, the case is highly differing; for *Christ* being our Patriarch in a supernatural birth; we fall infinitely short of him, and are not so like to him, as we were to *Adam*; and yet that we in greater unlikeness should receive a greater favour; this was the excess of the comparison, and this is the free gift of God.

17. *For if by one offence [so it is the King's MS. or,] if by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace, and of the gifts of righteousness, shall reign in life by one *Jesus Christ*.*

And this is the third degree, or measure of excess of efficacy on *Christ's* part, over it was on the part of *Adam*. For if the sin of *Adam* alone could bring death upon the world,

world, who by the imitation of his transgression on the stock of their own natural choice did sin against God though not after the similitude of *Adam's* transgression much more shall we, who not only receive the aids of the spirit of grace, but receive them also in an abundant measure, receive also the effect of all this even to reign in life by one Jesus Christ.

18. *Therefore as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life.*

Therefore now to return to the other part of the similitude where I began; although I have shewn the great excess and abundance of grace by Christ, over the evil that did descend by *Adam*; yet the proportion and comparison lies in the main emanation of death from one and life from the other; [*judgment unto condemnation*, that is, the sentence of death came upon all men by the offence of one; even so, by a like economy and dispensation, God would not be behind in doing an act of grace, as he did before of judgment; and as that judgment was to condemnation by the offence of one, so the free gift, and the grace came upon all to justification of life, by the righteousness of one.

19. *For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.*

The sum of all is this: By the disobedience of one man, *κατεσθηναι οἱ πολλοι*, many were constituted or put into the order of sinners they were made such by God's appointment; that is, not that God could be the Author of a sin to any, but that he appointed the evil which is the consequent of sin, to be upon their heads who descended from the sinner: and so it shall be on the other side; for by the obedience of one, even Christ, many shall be made, or constituted righteous. But still this must be with a supposition of what was said before, that there was a vast difference; for we are made much more righteous by Christ, than we were sinners by *Adam*; and the life we receive by Christ, shall be greater than the death by *Adam*; and the graces we derive from Christ, shall be more and mightier than the corruption and declination by *Adam*; but yet as one is the head, so is the other;

ther; one is the beginning of sin and death, and the
ther of life and righteousness.

It were easie to add many particulars out of *S. Paul*,
but I shall chuse only to recite the *Æthiopick* version of
the New Testament, translated into Latin by that excel-
lent Linguist and worthy Person, *Dr. Dudley Loftus*: the
words are these; "And therefore, as by the iniquity of
one man sin entred into the world, and because by
THAT SIN death came upon all men; therefore
THAT SIN IS IMPUTED TO ALL *Rom. 5.12,*
MEN, even those who knew not what that sin was. &c.

Until the Law came, sin remained in the world, not
known what it was; when sin was not reckoned, be-
cause as yet at that time the Commandment of the
Law was not come. Nevertheless death did after reign
from *Adam* until *Moses*, as well in those that did sin, as
in those that did not sin by that sin of *Adam*; because
every one was created in the similitude of *Adam*, and
because *Adam* was a type of him that was to come.
But not according to the quantity of our iniquity, was
the grace of God to us. If for the offence of one man
many are dead, how much more by the grace of God,
and by the gift of him who did gratifie us, by one
man, to wit, *Jesus Christ*, life hath abounded upon
many? Neither for the measure of the sin, which was of
one man, was there the like reckoning or account of the
grace of God. For if the condemnation of sin proceeding
from one man, caus'd that by that sin all should be pu-
nish'd, how much rather shall his grace purifie us from
our sins, and give us eternal life? If the sin of one made
death to reign, and by the offence of one man death did
rule in us; how much more therefore shall the grace of
one man *Jesus Christ* and his gift, justifie us, and make
us to reign in life eternal? And as by the offence of one
man many are condemned, likewise also by the righte-
ousness of one man shall every son of man be justified,
and live. And as by one man many are made sinners,
(or, as the *Syriack Version* renders it) there were many
sinners; in like manner again many are made righteous.
Now this reddition of the Apostle's discourse in this Arti-
cle, is a very great light to the understanding of the
words; which not the nature of the thing, but the popu-
lar glosses have made difficult. But here it is plain, that
all the notice of this Article which those Churches
derived

derived from these words of *S. Paul* was this: That the sin of *Adam* brought death into the world: That it was his sin alone, that did the great mischief: That his sin was made ours not by inheritance, but by imputation: That they who suffered the calamity, did not know what the sin was: That there was a difference of men, even in relation to this sin; and it passed upon some, more than upon others: That is, some were more miserable than others: That some did not sin by the sin of *Adam*, and some did; that is, some there were whose manners were not corrupted by that example, and some were; that it was not our sin, but his; that the sin did not multiply by the variety of subject, but was still but one sin; and that it was his, and not ours: all which particulars are as so many verifications of the doctrine I have delivered, and so many illustrations of the main Article. But in verification of one great part of it, I mean that concerning Infants, and that they are not corrupted properly, or made sinners by any inherent impurity, is clearly affirmed by *S. Peter*, whose words are rendered in the same *Æthiopick Testament*, 1 *Pet.* 2. 2. *And be ye like unto newly begotten infants, who are begotten every one without sin, or malice, and as milk not mingled.* And to the same sense those words of our Blessed Saviour to the *Pharisees* asking who sinn'd, this man, or his Parents? *Joh. 9.* the *Syriack Scholiast* does give this Paraphrase: "Some say it is an indirect question: For how is it possible for a man to sin before he was born?" "And if his Parents sinn'd, how could he bear their sin?" "But if they say, that the punishment of the Parents may be upon the children, let them know that this is spoken of them that came out of *Egypt*, and is not universal." And those words of *David*; *In sin hath my mother conceived me*, *R. David Kimchi* and *Abenesra* say, that they are expounded of *Eve*, who did not conceive till she had sinned. But to return to the words of *S. Paul*.

The consequent of this discourse must needs at least be this: That it is impossible that the greatest part of mankind should be left in the eternal bonds of Hell by *Adam*; for then, quite contrary to the discourse of the Apostle, there had been abundance of sin, but a scarcity of grace; and the excess had been on the part of *Adam*, not on the part of *Christ*, against which he so mightily and artificially contends: So that the *Presbyterian* way is perfectly con-

condemned by this discourse of the Apostle; and the other more gentle way, which affirms, that we were sentenced in *Adam* to eternal death, though the execution is taken off by Christ, is also no way countenanced by any thing in this Chapter: For that the judgment which from *Adam's* sin came unto the condemnation of the world, was nothing but *temporal death*, is here affirmed; it being in no sense imaginable, that the death which here *S. Paul* says *passed upon all men*, and which *reigned from Adam to Moses*, should be eternal death; for the Apostle speaks of that death which was threatened to *Adam*; and of such a death which was afterwards threatened in *Moses's* Law; and such a death which fell even upon the most righteous of *Adam's* posterity, *Abel*, and *Seth*, and *Methuselah*; that is, upon them who did not sin after the similitude of *Adam's* transgression. Since then, all the judgment, which the Apostle lays, came by the sin of *Adam*, was sufficiently and plainly enough affirmed to be death temporal, that God should sentence mankind to eternal damnation for *Adam's* sin, though in goodness through Christ he afterwards took it off; is not at all affirmed by the Apostle: And because in proportion to the evil, so was the imputation of the sin, it follows, that *Adam's* sin is ours metonymically and improperly; God was not finally angry with us: nor had so much as any designs of eternal displeasure upon that account; his anger went no farther than the evils of this life, and therefore the imputation was not of a proper guilt, for that might justly have passed beyond our grave and if the sin had passed beyond a metonymy, or a juridical, external imputation. And of this, God and man have given this farther testimony; that as no man ever imposed penance for it, so God himself in nature did never for it afflict or affright the conscience, and yet the conscience never spares any man that is guilty of a known sin.

*Exemplò quodcunque malum committitur, ipsi
Displicet auctori,-----*

He that is guilty of a sin,
Shall rue the crime that he lies in.

And why the conscience shall be for ever at so much peace for this sin, that a man shall never give one groan for his share of guilt in *Adam's* sin, unless some or other scares him with an impertinent proposition; why (I say) the conscience should not naturally be afflicted for it, nor

The Divine Goodness and Justice

so much as naturally know it, I confess I cannot yet make any reasonable conjecture, saving this only, that it is not properly a sin, but only metonymically and improperly. And indeed there are some whole Churches which think themselves so little concerned in the matter of Original Sin, that they have not a word of it in all their Theology: I mean the Christians in the *East-Indies*, concerning whom Fryar *Louis de Uretta* in his Ecclesiastical Story of *Æthiopia*, says, that the Christians in *Æthiopia*, under the Empire of *Prestre Juan*, never kept the immaculate conception of the *Virgin Mary*; [*No se entremetieron en esas Theologias del Peccato Original; porque nunca tuvieron los entendimientos muy metafísicos, antes como gente afable, benigna, Llana, de entendimientos conversables, y seguian la doctrina de los santos antiguos, y de los sagrados Concilios, sin disputas, ni diferencias:*] Nor do they insert into their Theology any Propositions concerning Original Sin, nor trouble themselves with Metaphysical contemplations; but being of an affable, ingenuous, gentle comportment, and understanding, follow the Doctrine of the Primitive Saints and Holy Councils, without disputation or difference; so says the story. But we unfortunately trouble our selves by raising Idea's of Sin, and afflict our selves with our own dreams, and will not believe but it is a vision. And the height of this imagination hath wrought so high in the Church of *Rome*, that when they would do great honors to the *Virgin Mary*, they were pleased to allow to her an immaculate conception, without any Original Sin, and a Holy-day appointed for the celebration of the dream. But the Christians in the other world are wiser, and trouble themselves with none of these things, but in simplicity honour the Divine Attributes, and speak nothing but what is easie to be understood. And indeed Religion is then the best, and the World will be sure to have fewer Atheists, and fewer Blasphemers, when the understandings of witty men are not tempted, by commanding them to believe impossible Articles, and unintelligible Propositions: When every thing is believed by the same simplicity it is taught; when we do not call that a Mystery which we are not able to prove, and tempt our Faith to swallow that whole, which Reason cannot chew.

One thing I am to observe more, before I leave considering the words of the Apostle. The Apostle here

having

having
that as
one we
Some f
throw
compa
Righte
righteo
fore so
I have
and ch
liverin
have c
righteo
offers a
one pa
therefo
ceive c
from J
very r
which
thus,
made
But t
really r
to inv
from r
affirm
power
ten po
what
thoug
shall b
this be
For th
the gr
to say
much
not co
powe
by hi
may
great
Adam

having instituted a comparison between *Adam* and *Christ*; that as death came by one, so life by the other; *as by one we are made sinners, so by the other we are made righteous*: Some from hence suppose they argue strongly to the overthrow of all that I have said, *thus*; *Christ* and *Adam* are compared, therefore as by *Christ* we are made really Righteous, so by *Adam* we are made really Sinners; our righteousness by *Christ* is more than imputed, and therefore so is our unrighteousness by *Adam*: to this, besides what I have already spoken in my humble addresses to that wise and charitable Prelate the Lord Bishop of *Rocheſter*, delivering the sense and objections of others; in which I have declared my sense in the imputation of *Christ's* righteousness; and besides, that although the Apostle offers a similitude, yet he finds himself surprised, and that one part of the similitude does far exceed the other, and therefore nothing can follow hence; but that if we receive evil from *Adam*, we shall receive much more good from *Jesus Christ*; besides this I say, I have something very material to reply to the form of this argument, which is a very trick and fallacy. For the Apostle argues thus, *As by Adam we are made sinners, so by Christ we are made righteous*; and that is very true, and much more: But to argue from hence, [as by *Christ* we are made really righteous, so by *Adam* we are made really sinners] is to invert the purpose of the Apostle, (who argues from the less to the greater) and to make it conclude affirmatively from the greater to the less in matter of power, is as if one should say; if a child can carry a ten pound weight, much more can a man: and therefore whatsoever a man can do, that also a child can do. For though I can say, *If this thing be done in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?* yet I must not say therefore, *If this be done in the dry tree, what shall be done in the green?* For the dry tree of the Cross, could do much more than the green tree in the Garden of *Eden*. It is good argument to say; If the Devil be so powerful to do a shrewd turn, much more powerful is God to do good: But we cannot conclude from hence, but God can by his own mere power and pleasure save a soul, therefore the Devil can by his power ruine one. In a Similitude, the first part may be, and often is, less than the second, but never greater: And therefore though the Apostle said, *as by Adam, &c. so by Christ, &c.* yet we cannot say, *as by Christ,*

so by Adam. We may well reason thus : As by Nature there is a reward to evil doers , so much more is there by God ; but we cannot by way of conversion, reason thus : As by God there is an eternal reward appointed to good actions ; so by Nature there is an eternal reward for evil ones. And who would not deride this way of arguing ? As by our Fathers we receive temporal good things , so much more do we by God : but by God we also receive an immortal Soul ; therefore from our Fathers we receive an immortal Body. For not the consequent of an hypothetical Proposition, but the antecedent, is to be the assumption of the Syllogism. This is therefore a fallacy, which when those wise Persons, who are unwarily persuaded by it, shall observe, I doubt not but the whole way of arguing will appear unconcluding.

Object. 6. But it is objected, that my Doctrine is against the ninth Article of the Church of *England* ; and that I hear, Madam, does most of all stick with you.

Of this, Madam, I should not now have taken notice, because I have already answered it in some additional Papers, which are already published ; but that I was so delighted to hear and to know, that a person of your interest and piety, zeal and prudence, is so earnest for the Church of *England* , that I could not pass it by, without paying you that regard and just acknowledgment which so much excellency deserves. But then, Madam, I am to say, that I could not be delighted in your zeal for our excellent Church, if I were not as zealous myself for it too : I have oftentimes subscribed that Article, and though if I had cause to dissent from it, I would certainly do it in those just measures, which my duty on one side , and the interest of truth on the other , would require of me : yet because I have no reason to disagree, I will not suffer myself to be supposed to be of a differing judgment from my dear Mother, which is the best Church of the World. Indeed, Madam, I do not understand the words of the Article as most men do ; but I understand them as they can be true , and as they can very fairly signify, and as they agree with the word of God and right reason. But I remember that I have heard from a very good hand , and there are many alive this day that may remember to have heard it talk'd of publickly, that when Mr. *Thomas Rogers* had in the year 1584 published an exposition of the Thirty Nine Articles, many

were

were
that
latitud
For th
reform
lingne
broke
cation
was v
of the
could
things
amon
Articl
descri
theret
deny
For
if the
impo
my re
neith
of m
when
nothi
have
by G
thoug
him
but f
mur

I
I do
liber
sure
thes
valu
abil
Chu

were not only then, but long since very angry at him, that he by his interpretation had limited the charitable latitude which was allowed in the subscription to them. For the Articles being framed in a Church but newly reformed, in which many complied with some unwillingness, and were not willing to have their consent broken by too great a straining; and even in the Convocation itself, so many being of a differing judgment, it was very great prudence and piety to secure the peace of the Church, by as much charitable latitude as they could contrive; and therefore the Articles, in those things which were publicly disputed at that time, even amongst the Doctors of the Reformation, (such were the Articles of Predestination, and this of Original Sin) were described, with incomparable wisdom and temper; and therefore I have reason to take it ill, if any man shall deny me liberty to use the benefit of the Church's wisdom: For I am ready a thousand times to subscribe the Article, if there can be just cause to do it so often; but as I impose upon no man my sense of the Article, but leave my reasons and him to struggle together for the best; so neither will I be bound to any one man, or any company of men, but to my lawful Superiors; speaking there, where they can and ought to oblige. Madam, I take nothing ill from any man, but that he should think I have a less zeal for our Church than himself, and I will by God's assistance be all my life confuting him; and though I will not contend with him, yet I will die with him in behalf of the Church, if God shall call me; but for other little things, and trifling arrests and little murmurs, I value none of it.

*Quid verum atque decens curo, & rogo, & omnis in
hoc sum;*

*Condo & compono quod max depromere possim,
Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri:*

Quo me cunque rapit tempestas deferor -----

I could translate these also into bad *English* verse, as I do the others; but that now I am earnest for my liberty, I will not so much as confine my self to the measure of feet. But in plain *English* I mean by rehearsing these *Latin* verses, that although I love every man, and value worthy persons in proportion to their labours and abilities, whereby they can and do serve God and God's Church, yet I enquire for what is fitting, not what is

D 2 pleasing;

pleasing; I search after ways to advantage souls, not to comply with humours, and sects, and interests; and I am tied to no man's private opinion, any more than he is to mine; if he will bring Scripture and right reason from any topick, he may govern me and persuade me, else I am free, as he is: but I hope I am before-hand with him in this question.

But one thing more I am willing to add. By the confession of all the Schools of Learning, it is taught, that Baptism hath infallibly all that effect upon Infants which God design'd, and the Church intends to them in the ministry of that Sacrament; because Infants cannot *ponere obicem*, they cannot impede the gift of God, and they hinder not the effect of God's Spirit. Now all hindrances of the operation of the Sacrament, is sin; and if sin, before the ministration be not morally rescinded, it remains; and remaining, is a disposition contrary to the effect of the Sacrament. Every inherent sin is the *obex*, bars the gates, that the grace of the Sacrament shall not enter. Since therefore Infants do not bar the gates, do not hinder the effect of the Sacrament, it follows, they have no sin inherent in them, but imputed only. If it be replied, that Original Sin, though it be properly a Sin, and really inherent, yet it does not hinder the effect of the Sacrament: I answer, then it follows, that Original Sin is of less malignity than the least Actual Sin in the world; and if so, then either by it no man is hated by God to eternal damnation, no man is by it an enemy to God, a son of wrath, an heir of perdition; or if he be, then at the same time he may be actually hated by God, and yet worthily disposed for receiving the Grace and Sacrament of Baptism; and that Sin which of all the Sins in the world is supposed to be the greatest, and of most universal and permanent mischief, shall do the least harm; and is less opposed to God's Grace, and indisposes a man less than a single wanton thought, or the first consent to a forbidden action; which he that can believe, is very much in love with his own Proposition, and is content to believe it upon any terms. I end with the words of *Lucretius*:

*Desine quapropter novitate exterritus ipsâ
Expuere ex animo rationem, sed magis acri
Judicio perpende; Et si tibi vera videtur,
Dede manus; aut si falsa est, accingere contrâ.*

Fear

Fear not to own what's said, because 'tis new,
Weigh well and wisely, if the thing be true:
Truth and not conquest, is the best reward;
'Gainst falshood only stand upon thy guard.

Madam,

I Humbly beg you will be pleased to
entertain these Papers, not only as a
Testimony of my Zeal for Truth and
Peace below, and for the Honour of God
above; but also of my readiness to seize
upon every occasion whereby I may express
my self to be

Your most obliged and most
Humble Servant in the
Religion of the H. *Jesus*,

JER. TAYLOR.

*An Answer to a Letter written by the R. R.
the Lord Bishop of Rochester; con-
cerning the Chapter of ORIGINAL
SIN, in the Unum Necessarium.*

R. R. Father and my Good Lord,

YOUR Lordship's Letter, dated July 28, I received not till Septemb. 11; it seems R. R. detained it in his hands, supposing it could not come safely to me, while I remain a prisoner now in *Chepstow-Castle*. But I now have the liberty that I can receive any Letters, and send any; for the Gentlemen under whose custody I am, as they are careful of their charges, so they are civil to my person. It was necessary I should tell this to your Lordship, that I may not be under a suspicion of neglecting to give account in those particulars, which with so much prudence and charity you were pleased to represent in your Letter, concerning my discourse of Original Sin. My Lord, in all your Exceptions, I cannot chuse but observe your candour, and your paternal care concerning me. For when there was nothing in the Doctrine, but your great reason did easily see the justice and truth of it, and I am persuaded could have taught me to have said many more material things, in confirmation of what I have taught; yet so careful is your charity of me, that you would not omit to represent to my consideration, what might be said by captious and weaker persons; or by the more wise and pious, who are of a different judgment.

But my Lord, First you are pleased to note, that this discourse runs not in the ordinary channel. True; for if it did, it must nurse the popular error: but when the disease is Epidemical, as it is so much the worse, so the extraordinary remedy must be acknowlegd'd to be the better. And if there be in it some things hard to be

under-

understood, as it was the fate of S. Paul's Epistles, (as your Lordship notes out of S. Peter) yet this difficulty of understanding proceeds not from the thing itself, nor from the manner of handling it, but from the indisposition and prepossession of men's minds to the contrary, who are angry, when they are told that they have been deceived: for it is usual with men to be more displeased, when they are told they were in error, than to be pleased with them who offer to lead them out of it.

But your Lordship doth with great advantages represent an objection of some captious persons, which relates not to the material part of the question, but to the rules of art. If there be no such thing as Original Sin transmitted from Adam to his posterity, then all that sixth Chapter is a strife about a shadow, a *Non ens*. *Ans.* It is true, my Lord, the question as it is usually handled, is so. For when the *Franciscan* and *Dominican* do eternally dispute about the conception of the Blessed Virgin, whether it was with, or without Original Sin; meaning by way of grace and special exemption, this is *de Non ente*; for there was no need of any such exemption: and they supposing that commonly it was otherwise, troubled themselves about the exception of a rule, which in that sense which they suppos'd it, was not true at all: She was born as innocent from any impurity or formal guilt, as Adam was created; and so was her Mother, and so was all her family. * When the *Lutheran* and the *Roman* dispute, whether Justice and Original Righteousness in Adam was Natural or by Grace, it is *de Non ente*: for it was positively neither, but negatively only; he had Original Righteousness till he sinn'd, that is, he was righteous till he became unrighteous. * When the *Calvinist* troubles himself and his Parishioners with fierce declamations against natural inclinations or concupiscence, and disputes whether it remains in baptized persons, or whether it be taken off by Election, or by the Sacrament; whether to all Christians, or to few; this is a *quæstio inane*: for it is no sin at all in persons baptiz'd or unbaptiz'd, till it be consented to.

My Lord, when I was a young man in Cambridge, I knew a learned professor of Divinity, whose ordinary lectures in the Lady Margaret's Chair for many years together, nine as I suppose, or thereabouts, were concerning Original Sin, and the appendant questions: This indeed

indeed could not chuse but be *Andabatarum confictus*. But then my discourse representing that these disputes are useless, and as they discourse usually to be *de Non ente*, is not to be reprov'd. For I profess to evince that many of those things, of the sence of which they dispute are not true at all in any sence, I declare them to be *de Non ente*; that is, I untie their intricate knots by cutting them in pieces. For when a false proposition is the ground of disputes, the process must needs be infinite, unless you discover the first error. He that tells them they both fight about a shadow, and with many arguments proves the vanity of their whole process, they (if he says true) not he is the *συνμαχος*. * When *S. Austin* was horribly puzzled about the traduction of Original Sin, and thought himself forc'd to say, that either the Father begat the soul, or that he could not transmit sin which is subjected in the soul, or at least he could not tell how it was transmitted: he had no way to be relieved, but by being told, that Original Sin is not subjected in the soul, because properly and formally it was no real sin of ours at all; but that it was only by imputation, and to certain purposes, not any inherent quality, or corruption: and so in effect all his trouble was *de Non ente*. * But now some wits have lately risen in the Church of *Rome*, and they tell us another story. The soul follows the temperature of the body, and so Original Sin comes to be transmitted by contact: because the constitution of the body is the *fomes* or nest of the sin, and the soul's concupiscence is deriv'd from the body's lust. But besides that this fancy disappears at the first handling, and there would be so many Original Sins as there are several constitutions, and the guilt would not be equal, and they who are born Eunuch's should be less infected by *Adam's* pollution, by having less of concupiscence in the great instance of desires; [and after all, concupiscence itself could not be a sin in the soul, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it;] [and in the whole process of it must be an impossible thing, because the instrument, which hath all its operations by the force of the principal agent, cannot of itself produce a great change and violent effect upon the principal agent.] Besides all this, (I say) while one does not know how Original Sin can be derived, and another who thinks he can, names a wrong way; and both the ways infer it to be another kind of thing than all

the Schools of Learning teach : Does it not too clearly demonstrate, that all that infinite variety of fancies, agreeing in nothing but in an endless uncertainty, is nothing else but the being busie about the quiddity of a dream, and the constituent parts of a shadow? But then, my Lord, my discourse representing all this to be vanity and uncertainty, ought not to be call'd, or suppos'd to be a *συναμαχία* as he that ends the Question between two Schoolmen disputing about the place of Purgatory, by saying, they need not trouble themselves about the place; for that which is not, hath no place at all; ought not to be told he contends about a shadow, when he proves that to be true, which he suggested to the two trifling Litigants.

But as to the thing itself: I do not say that there is no such thing as Original Sin, but is not that which it is suppos'd to be: it is not our sin formally, but by imputation only; and it is imputed so, as to be an inlet to sickness, death and disorder: but it does not introduce a necessity of sinning, nor damn any one to the flames of Hell. So that Original Sin is a not a *Non ens*, unless that be nothing which infers so many real mischiefs.

The next thing your Lordship is pleas'd to note to me, is that in your wisdom you foresee, some will argue against my explication of the word *Damnation*, in the Ninth Article of our Church, which affirms that Original Sin deserves damnation. Concerning which, my Lord, I do thus (and I hope fairly) acquit my self.

1. That it having been affirmed by *S. Austin*, that Infants dying unbaptized are damn'd, he is deservedly called *durus pater Infantum*, and generally forsaken by all sober men of the later ages: And it will be an intolerable thing to think the Church of *England* guilty of that which all her wiser sons, and all the Christian Churches generally abhor. I remember that I have heard that *K. James* reproving a *Scottish* Minister, who refus'd to give private Baptism to a dying Infant; being ask'd by the Minister, if he thought the Child should be damn'd for want of Baptism? answered, No, but I think you may be damn'd for refusing it: and he said well. But then, my Lord, if Original Sin deserves damnation, then may Infants be damn'd if they die without Baptism. But if it be a horrible affirmative, to say that the poor Babes shall be made Devils, or enter into their portion, if they want that

that ceremony, which is the only gate, the only way of salvation that stands open; then the word [*damnation*] in the Ninth Article must mean something less, than what is usually understood by it: Or else the Article must be salvaged, by expounding some other word to an allay and lessening of the horrible sentence; and particularly the word [*deserves,*] of which I shall afterwards give account. Both these ways I follow. The first is the way of the School-Men.

For they suppose the state of unbaptized Infants to be *pena damni*; and they are confident enough to say, that this may be well supposed, without inferring their suffering the pains of Hell. But this sentence of theirs I admit, and explicate, with some little difference of expression. For so far I admit this *pain of loss*, or rather a deficiency from going to Heaven, to be the consequence *Adam's* fault, that by it we being left *in meris naturalibus*, could never by these strengths alone have gone to Heaven. Not so, whereas your Lordship in behalf of those whom you suppose to be captious, is pleas'd to argue, That as loss of sight or eyes, infers a state of darkness or blindness; so the loss of Heaven, infers Hell: and if Infants go not to Heaven in that state, whither can they go, but to Hell, and that's Damnation in the greatest sense. I grant it, that if *in the event of things* they do not go to Heaven, (as things are now ordered) it is but too likely that they go to Hell: But I add, that as all darkness does not infer horror and distraction of mind, or fearful apparitions and phantasms; so neither does all Hell, or states in Hell, infer all those torments which the School-Men signify by a *pena sensus*, (for I speak now in pursuance of their way.) So that there is no necessity of a third place; but it concludes only, that in the state of separation from God's presence, there is a great variety of degrees and kinds of evil, and every one is not the extreme: And yet by the way, let me observe, that *Gregory Nazianzen* and *Nicetas* taught that there is a third place, for Infants and Heathens; and *Irenaeus* affirm'd, that evils of Hell were not eternal to all, but to the Devils only, and the greater criminals. But neither they nor we, nor any man else can, tell whether Hell be a place or no; it is a state of evil; but whether all the damned be in one, or in twenty places, we cannot tell.

But

But I have no need to make use of any of this. For when I affirm that Infants being by *Adam* reduc'd and left to their mere natural state, fall short of Heaven, I do not say they cannot go to Heaven at all, but they cannot go thither by their natural powers, they cannot without new grace and favour go to Heaven. But then it cannot presently be inferred, that therefore they go to Hell; but this ought to be inferr'd, which indeed was the real consequent of it; therefore it is necessary that God's Grace should supply this defect, if God intends Heaven to them at all; and because Nature cannot, God sent a Saviour by whom it was effected. But if it be asked, what if this Grace had not come? and that it be said, that without God's Grace they must have gone to Hell, because without it they could not go to Heaven? I answer, that we know how it is, now that God in his goodness hath made provisions for them: But if he had not made such provisions, what would have been we know not, any more than we know what would have followed, if *Adam* had not sinned; where he should have liv'd, and how long, and in what circumstances the posterity should have been provided for in all their possible contingencies. But yet, this I know, that it follows not, that if without *this* Grace we could not have gone to Heaven, that therefore we must have gone to Hell. For although the first was ordinarily impossible, yet the second was absolutely unjust, and against Goodness, and therefore more impossible. But because the first could not be done by nature, God was pleased to promise and give us his grace, that he might bring us to that state whither he had design'd us; that is, to a supernatural felicity. If *Adam* had not fallen, yet Heaven had not been a natural consequent of his obedience, but a gracious, it had been a gift still: And of *Adam*, though he had persisted in innocence, it is true to say, That without God's Grace, that is, by the mere force of nature he never could have arriv'd to a supernatural state, that is, to the joys of Heaven; and yet it does not follow, that he had remain'd in innocence, he must have gone to Hell. Just so it is in Infants, Hell was not made for Man, but for Devils; and therefore it must be something besides mere nature, that can bear any Man thither: mere nature neither goes to Heaven nor Hell. So that when I say Infants naturally cannot go to Heaven, and that this is a punishment of *Adam's* sin, he being for it punished

punished with a loss of his gracious condition, and devolv'd to the state of Nature, and we by him left so. My meaning is, that this Damnation which is of our Nature is but negative, that is, as a consequent of our Patriarchal sin, our Nature is left imperfect and deficient in order to a supernatural end; which the School-Men call *pœnam damni*, but improperly: They think indeed it may be a real event, and final condition of persons as well as things; but I affirm it was an evil effect of *Adam's* sin: but in the event of things, it became to the persons the way to a new grace, and hath no other event as to Heaven and Hell directly and immediately. In the same sense, and to the same purpose, I understand the word Damnation in the Ninth Article.

But the word [*damnation*] may very well, truly, and sufficiently signify all the purposes of the Article, if it be taken only for the effect of that sentence which was inflicted upon *Adam*, and descended on his posterity; that is, for condemnation to Death, and the evils of mortality. So the word is used by *S. Paul*, 1 Cor. 11. 29, *He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself.* *Keiua* is the word, but that it did particularly signify temporal death and evils, appears by the instances of probation in the next words; *For, for this cause some are weak amongst you, some are sick, and some are fallen asleep.* This also in the Article. Original Sin deserves damnation, that is, it justly brought in the angry sentence of God upon Man, it brought him to death, and he deserv'd it; it brought it upon us, and we deserv'd it too. I do not say that we by that sin deserv'd that death, neither can death be properly a punishment of us, till we superadd some evil of our own; yet *Adam's* sin deserv'd it so that it was justly left to fall upon us, we, as a consequent and punishment of his sin, being reduc'd to our natural portion. *In odiosis, quod minimum est sequimur.* The lesser sense of the word is certainly agreeable to truth and reason: And it were good we us'd the word in that sense which may be warrant her doctrine, especially for that use of the word, having the precedent of Scripture.

I am confirm'd in this interpretation by the second Section of the Article, *viz.* of the remanency of Concupiscence or Original Sin in the Regenerate. All the sinfulness of Original Sin is the lust or concupiscence that

that is, the proneness to sin. Now then I demand, whether Concupiscence before actual consent be a sin or no? And if it be a sin, whether it deserves damnation? That all sin deserves damnation, I am sure our Church denies not. If therefore concupiscence before consent be a sin, then this also deserves damnation where-ever it is: and if so, then a man may be damned for Original Sin, even after Baptism. For even after Baptism, concupiscence (or the sinfulness of Original Sin) remains in the regenerate; and that which is the same thing, the same viciousness, the same enmity to God after Baptism, is as damnable, it deserves damnation as much as that did that went before. If it be replied, that Baptism takes off the guilt, or formal part, but leaves the material part behind; that is, though concupiscence remains, yet it shall not bring damnation to the regenerate or baptized. I answer, that though baptismal regeneration puts a man into a state of grace and favour, so that what went before shall not be imputed to him afterwards; that is, *Adam's* sin shall not bring damnation, (in any sense) yet it hinders not, but that what is sinful afterwards shall be then imputed to him; that is, he may be damn'd for his own concupiscence. He is quitted from it, as it came from *Adam*; but by Baptism he is not quitted from it, as it is subjected in himself, if (I say) concupiscence before consent be a sin. If it be no sin, then for it, Infants unbaptized cannot with justice be damn'd; it does not deserve damnation: But if it be a sin, then so long as it is there, so long it deserves damnation; and Baptism did only quit the relation of it to *Adam*, (for that was all that went before it) but not the danger of the matter. * But because the Article supposes that it does not damn the regenerate or baptized, and yet that it hath the nature of sin, it follows evidently and undeniably, that both the phrases are to be diminished, and understood in a favourable sense. As the phrase [the Nature of Sin] signifies, so does [Damnation;] but [the Nature of Sin] signifies something that brings no guilt, because it is affirm'd to be in the regenerate; therefore [Damnation] signifies something that brings no Hell: But [to deserve Damnation] must mean something less than ordinary; that is, that concupiscence is a thing not morally good, not to be allow'd of, not to be nurs'd, but mortifi'd, fought against, disapprov'd, condemn'd and disallow'd of men as it is of God.

And

And truly, my Lord, to say that for *Adam's* sin it is just in God to condemn Infants to the eternal flames of Hell; and to say, that concupiscence or natural inclinations before they pass into any act, could bring eternal condemnation from God's presence into the eternal position of Devils, are two such horrid propositions, that if any Church in the world would expressly affirm them, I for my part should think it unlawful to communicate with her in the defence or profession of either; and to think it would be the greatest temptation in the world to make men not to love God, of whom men so easily speak such horrid things. I would suppose the Article to mean any thing, rather than any of these. But yet one thing more I have to say.

The Article is certainly to be expounded according to the analogy of Faith, and the express words of Scripture, if there be any that speak expressly in this matter. Now whereas the Article explicating Original Sin, affirms it to be that fault or corruption of man's nature, (*vitium naturæ*, not *peccatum*.) by which he is far gone from Original righteousness, and is inclin'd to evil: because this is not full enough, the Article adds by way of explanation, [*so that the flesh lusteth against the spirit*;] that is, it really produceth a state of evil temptations: It lusteth, that is, actually and habitually; [it lusteth against the spirit, and therefore deserves God's wrath, and damnation.] So the Article: *therefore*; for no other reason, but because the flesh lusteth against the spirit; not because it can lust, or is *apta nata* to lust, but because it lusteth *actually, therefore it deserves damnation*: and this is *Original Sin*; or as the Article expresses it, *it hath the nature of sin*; it is the *fomes*, or matter of sin, and is in the Original of mankind, and deriv'd from *Adam* as our body is, but it deserves not damnation in the highest sense of the word, till the concupiscence be actual: Till then, the words of [Wrath and Damnation] must be meant in the less and more easie signification, according to the former explication; and must only relate to the personal sin of *Adam*. To this sense of the Article I heartily subscribe. For besides the reasonableness of the thing, and the very manner of speaking us'd in the Article; it is the very same way of speaking, and exactly the same doctrine which we find in *S. James*, (*Jam. 14. 14.*) *ἡ ἐνσκήψις τῆς σαρκὸς*, *Concupiscence*, when it is impregnated

when

when it hath conceiv'd, then it brings forth sin: and sin when it is in production and birth, brings forth death. But in Infants, concupiscence is innocent and a virgin, it conceives not, and therefore is without sin, and therefore without death or damnation. * Against these expositions I cannot imagine what can be really and materially objected.

But, my Lord, I perceive the main out-cry is like to be upon the authority of the *Harmony of Confessions*. Concerning which, I shall say this, That in this Article the Harmony makes as good musick as Bells ringing backward; and they agree, especially when they come to be explicated and untwisted into their minute and explicate meanings, as much as *Lutheran* and *Calvinist*, as *Papist* and *Protestant*, as *Thomas* and *Scotus*, as *Remonstrant* and *Dordrechtan*, that is, as much as *pro* and *con*, or but a very little more. I have not the book with me here in Prison, and this neighbourhood cannot supply me, and I dare not trust my memory to give a scheme of it: but your Lordship knows that in nothing more do the Reformed Churches disagree, than in this and its appendages; and you are pleased to hint something of it, by saying, that some speak more of this than the Church of *England*: and *Andrew Rivet*, tho' unwillingly, yet confesses, *De Confessionibus nostris & earum syntagmata vel Harmonia, etiamsi in non nullis capitibus non plane convenient, dicam tamen, melius in concordiam redigi posse quam in Ecclesia Romana concordantium discordantium Canonum, quo titulo decretum Gratiani, quod Canonistis regulas praefigit, solet insigniri*. And what he affirms of the whole collection, is most notorious in the Article of Original Sin. For my own part I am ready to subscribe the first *Helvetian* confession, but not the second. So much difference there is in the confession of the same Church.

Now whereas your Lordship adds, that tho' they are fallible, yet when they bring evidence of holy Writ, their assertions are infallible, and not to be contradicted: I am bound to reply, that when they do so, whether they be infallible or no, I will believe them, because then tho' they might, yet they are not deceived. But as evidence of holy Writ had been sufficient without their authority; so without such evidence their authority is nothing. But then, my Lord, their citing and urging the words of *S. Paul*, *Rom. 5. 12.* is so far from being an evident proba-

E

tion

tion of their Article, that nothing is to me a surer argument of their fallibility, than the urging of that which evidently makes nothing for them, but much against them: As 1. Affirming expressly, that death was the event of *Adam's* sin; the whole event, for it names no other; temporal death; according to that saying of *S. Paul*, *1 Cor.* 15. *In Adam we all die.* And 2. Affirming this process of death to be ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον which is and ought to be taken to be the ailay or condition of the condemnation. It became a punishment to them only who did sin; but upon them also inflicted for *Adam's* sake.

A like expression to which is in the *Psalms*, *Psal.* 106. 32, 33. *They anger'd him also at the waters of strife, so that he punished Moses for their sakes.* Here was plainly a transduction of evil from the Nation to *Moses* their relative: For their sakes he was punish'd, but yet ἐφ' ᾧ Μωσῆς ἥμαρτε, for as much as *Moses* had sinned: for so it follows, because they provoked his spirit, so that he spake unadvisedly with his lips. So it is between *Adam* and us. He sinn'd, and God was highly displeased. This displeasure went further than upon *Adam's* sin: for tho' that only was threaten'd with death, yet the sins of his children, which were not so threaten'd, became so punish'd, and they were by nature heirs of wrath and damnation; that is, for his sake our sins inherited his curse. The curse that was specially and only threaten'd to him, we when we sinn'd did inherit for his sake. So that it is not so properly called *Original Sin*, as an *Original Curse* upon our sin.

To this purpose we have also another example of God transmitting the Curse from one to another: Both were sinners, but one was the Original of the Curse or Punishment. So said the Prophet to the wife of *Jeroboam*, *1 Kings* 14. 16. [*He shall give Israel up, because of the sins of Jeroboam, who did sin, and who made Israel to sin*] *Jeroboam* was the root of the sin and of the curse. Here it was also (that I may use the words of the Apostle) that by the sin of one man [*Jeroboam*] sin went out into all [*Israel*] and the curse, captivity, or death by sin, and so death went upon all men [*of Israel*] ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον in as much as all men [*of Israel*] have sinned. If these men had not sinned, they had not been punished: I cannot say they had not been afflicted; for *David's* child was smitten for his father's fault: but tho' they did sin, yet unless their root and principal had sinned, possibly they should not have

have so been punished: For his sake the punishment came. Upon the same account it may be, that we may inherit the damnation or curse for *Adam's* sake, though we deserve it; yet it being transmitted from *Adam*, and not particularly threaten'd to the first posterity, we were his heirs, the heirs of death, deriving from him an Original curse, but due also (if God so pleased) to our sins. And this is the full sense of the 12 verse; and the effect of the phrase ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἡμαρτον.

But your Lordship is pleased to object, that though ἐφ' ᾧ does once signify [For as much as] yet three times it signifies *in* or *by*. To this I would be content to submit, if the observation could be verified, and be material when it were true. But besides that it is so used in 2 Cor. 5. 4. your Lordship may please to see it used (as not only myself, but indeed most men, and particularly the Church of *England* does read and expound it) in *Mat.* 26. 50. And yet if ἐφ' ᾧ were written ἐν ᾧ, which is the same with *in* or *by*, if it be render'd word for word, yet ἐφ' ᾧ, twice in the Scripture signifies [for as much as] as you may read *Rom.* 8. 3. and *Heb.* 2. 18. So that here are two places besides this in question, and two more *ex abundanti* to shew, that if it were not ἐφ' ᾧ, but said in words expressly, as you would have it in the meaning, yet even so neither the thing, nor any part of the thing could be evicted against me: And lastly, if it were not only said ἐν ᾧ, but that that sense of it were admitted which is desired, and that it did mean *in* or *by* in this very place: yet the question were not at all the nearer to be concluded against me. For I grant that it is true [*in him we are all sinners*] as it is true that [*in him we all die*] that is, for his sake we are used as sinners; being miserable really, but sinners in account and effect; as I have largely discoursed in my book. But then for the place here in question, it is so certain, that it signifies the same thing (as our Church reads it) that it is not sense without it, but a violent breach of the period without precedent or reason. And after all, I have looked upon those places where ἐφ' ᾧ is said to signify *in* or *by*, and in one of them I find it so, *Mat.* 2. 4. but in *Acts* 3. 16. and *Phil.* 1. 3. I find it not at all in any sense: but ἐν indeed is used for *in* or *by*, in that of the *Acts*; and in the other it signifies, *at* or *upon*; but if all were granted that is pretended to, it no way prejudices my cause, as I have already proved.

Next to these your Lordship seems a little more zealous and decratory in the Question upon the confidence of the 17, 11, and 19. Verses of the 5. Chapter to the *Romans*. The sum of which, as your Lordship most ingeniously sums it up, is this. "As by one many were made sinners: so
 "by one many were made righteous, that by *Adam*, this
 "by *Christ*. But by *Christ* we are made *δικαιοι*, just,
 "not by imputation only, but effectively and to real purposes; therefore by *Adam* we are really made sinners,
 "and this your Lordship confirms by the observation of
 "the sense of two words here used by the Apostle. The
 "first is *κατάκριμα*, which signifies a sentence of guilt,
 "or punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon
 "whom the condemnation comes, because God punishes
 "none but for their own sin, *Ezek.* 18. 2. From the
 "word *δικαιοι*, clear from sin, so your Lordship renders it: and in opposition to this *ἀμαρτωλοὶ*, is to be
 "render'd, that is, guilty, criminal persons, really and
 "properly. This is all which the wit of man can say from this place of *St. Paul*, and if I make it appear that this is invalid, I hope I am secure.

To this then I answer: That the *Antithesis* in these words here urg'd, (for there is another in the Chapter) and this whole argument of *S. Paul*, is full and intire, without descending to minutes. Death came in by one man, much more shall life come by one man; if that by *Adam*, then much more this by *Christ*: by him to condemnation, by this man to justification. This is enough to verifie the argument of *S. Paul*, tho' life and death did not come in the same manner to the several relatives; as indeed they did not: of which afterwards. But for the present, it runs thus: By *Adam* we were made sinners; by *Christ* we are made righteous: As certainly one as the other, tho' not in the same manner of dispensation. By *Adam* *θάνατος ἐβασίλευσε*, death reigned; by this man the reign of death shall be destroyed, and life set up instead of it; by him we were us'd as sinners, for in him we died, but by *Christ* we are justified, that is, us'd as just persons, for by him we live. This is sufficient for the Apostles argument, and yet no necessity to affirm that we are sinners in *Adam* any more than by imputation: for we are by *Christ* made just, no otherwise than by imputation.

In the proof or perswasion I will use no indirect arguments, as to say, that to deny us to be just by imputation,

is the
 Conv
Calvi
 the C
 ny of
 not o
 such
 the c
 much
 that
 for j
 know
 them
 think
 side,
 of ho
 were
 to fa
 Berw
 C
 catio
 fied
 Ende
 right
 impu
 but c
 were
 viz.
 ction
 and
 righ
 gelic
 A
 grea
 dan
 or i
 ther
 and
 can
 ano
 per
 his
 act
 for

is the Doctrine of the Church of *Rome* and of the *Socinian* Conventicles, but expressly dislik'd by all the *Lutheran*, *Calvinist*, and *Zuinglian* Churches, and particularly by the Church of *England*. and indeed by the whole Harmony of Confessions: This, I say, I will not make use of; not only because I my self do not love to be press'd by such prejudices rather than arguments; but because the question of the imputation of righteousness is very much mistaken and misunderstood on all hands. They that say that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us for justification, do it upon this account, because they know all that we do is imperfect, therefore they think themselves constrain'd to fly to Christ's righteousness, and think it must be imputed to us, or we perish. The other side, considering that this way would destroy the necessity of holy living; and that, in order to our justification, there were conditions requir'd on our parts, think it necessary to say that we are justified by inherent righteousness. Between these the truth is plain enough to be read. Thus:

Christ's righteousness is not imputed to us for justification directly and immediately; neither can we be justified by our own righteousness: but our Faith and sincere Endeavours are, through Christ, accepted instead of legal righteousness: that is, we are justified through Christ, by imputation, not of Christ's, nor our own righteousness; but of our faith and endeavours of righteousness, as if they were perfect: and we are justified by a Non-imputation, viz. of our past sins, and present unavoidable imperfections: that is, we are handled as if we were just persons and no sinners. So faith was imputed to *Abraham* for righteousness; not that it made him so, *legally*, but *Evangelly*, that is, by grace and imputation.

And indeed, my Lord, that I may speak freely in this great question: when one man hath sinned, his descendants and relatives, cannot possibly by him, or for him, or in him be made sinners properly and really. For in sin there are but two things imaginable: the irregular action, and the guilt, or obligation to punishment. Now we cannot in any sense be said to have done the action which another did, and not we: the action is as individual as the person; and *Titius* may as well be *Cajus*, and the Son be his own Father, as he can be said to have done the Father's action; and therefore we cannot possibly be guilty of it: for guilt is an obligation to punishment for having done it;

the action and the guilt are relatives; one cannot be without the other: something must be done inwardly or outwardly, or there can be no guilt. But then for the evil of punishment, that may pass further than the action. If it passes upon the innocent, it is not a punishment to them, but an evil inflicted by right of Dominion; but yet by reason of the relation of the afflicted to him that sinned, to him it is a punishment. But if it passes upon others that are not innocent, then it is a punishment to both; to the first principally; to the Descendents or Relatives, for the others sake; his sin being imputed so far.

How far that is in the present case, and what it is, the Apostle expresses thus: It was ἀεὶ εἰς κατάνειμα, verse 18. or κείμα εἰς κατάνειμα, verse 16. a curse unto condemnation, or a judgment unto condemnation, that is, a curse inherited from the principal; deserv'd by him, and and yet also actually descending upon us after we had sinned, ἀεὶ or κείμα εἰς κατάνειμα; that is, the judgment passed upon Adam; the ἀεὶ or κείμα was on him; but it prov'd to be a κατάνειμα, or a thorow condemnation, when from him it passed upon all men that sinned. Κείμα and κατάνειμα, sometimes differ in degrees: so the words are used by S. Paul elsewhere (1 Cor. 11. 32.) κενόμηνον ἵνα μὴ κατακείδωμεν, a judgment to prevent a punishment, or a less to fore-stall a greater in the same kind: so here the ἀεὶ pass'd further; the κείμα was fulfilled in his posterity passing on further, viz. that all who sinned should pass under the power of death as well as he: but this became formally and actually a punishment to them only who did sin personally: to them it was κατάνειμα.

This ἀεὶ or κείμα, is the βασιλεία τοῦ θανάτου, vers. 17. the reign of death; this is called βασιλεία τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ, verse 21. the reign of sin in death: that is, the effect which Adam's sin had, was only to bring in the reign of death, which is already broken by Jesus Christ, and at last shall be quite destroyed. But to say that sin here is properly transmitted to us from Adam, formally, and so as to be inherent in us, is to say that we were made to do his action, which is a perfect contradiction.

Now then your Lordship sees that what you note of the meaning of κατάνειμα I admit, and is indeed true enough, and agreeable to the discourse of the Apostle, and very much in justification of what I taught. κατάνειμα signifies a punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon whom the

the condemnation comes. I easily subscribe to it : but then take in the words of St. Paul, *δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος*, by one sin, or by the sin of one, the curse passed upon all men unto condemnation ; that is, the curse descended from Adam ; for his sake it was propagated *εἰς κατάκριμα* to a real condemnation, viz. when they should sin. For though this *ἀρχὴ* or the curse of death was threatened only to Adam, yet upon God's being angry with him, God resolved it should descend : and if men did sin as Adam, or if they did sin at all, though less than Adam, yet the *ἀρχὴ* or the curse threatened to him should pass, *εἰς κατάκριμα*, unto the same actual condemnation which fell upon him, that is, it should actually bring them under the reign of death.

But then, my Lord, I beseech you let it be considered, if this *κατάκριμα* must suppose a punishment for sin, for the sin of him, his own sin that is so condemned, as your Lordship proves perfectly out of Ezek. 18. how can it be just that the *κατάκριμα* condemnation should pass upon us for Adam's sin, that is, not for his own sin who is so condemned, but for the sin of another? S. Paul easily resolves the doubt, if there had been any. The *κατάκριμα*, the reign of death passed upon all men, *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον*, in as much as all men have sinned. And now why shall we suppose that we must be guilty of what we did not, when without any such *φαινόμενον* there is so much guilt of what we did really and personally? Why shall it be that we die only for Adam's sin, and not rather as S. Paul expressly affirms, *ἐφ' ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον* in as much as all men have sinned, since by your own argument it cannot be *in as much as all men have not sinned*, this you say cannot be, and yet you will not confess this which can be, and which S. Paul affirms to have been indeed : as if it were not more just and reasonable to say, That from Adam the curse descended unto the condemnation of the sins of the World, than to say the curse descended without consideration of their sins ; but a sin must be imagined to make it seem reasonable and just to condemn us. [Now I submit it to the judgment of all the world, which way of arguing is most reasonable and concluding : You, my Lord, in behalf of others argue thus. *Κατάκριμα* or condemnation cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own : Therefore every man is truly guilty of Adam's sin, and that becomes his own. Against this I oppose mine. *Κατάκριμα* or condemnation cannot pass upon

a man for any sin but his own ; therefore it did not pass upon man for *Adam's* sin, because *Adam's* sin was *Adam's*, not our own : But we all have sinned, we have sins of our own, therefore for these the curse passed from *Adam* to us. To back mine, besides that common notices of sense and reason defend it, I have the plain words of *S. Paul* ; *Death passed upon all men, for as much as all men have sinned* ; all men, that is, the generality of mankind, all that liv'd till they could sin, the others that died before, died in their nature, not in their sin, neither *Adam's* nor their own, save only that *Adam* brought it in upon them, or rather left it to them, himself being disrobed of all that which could hinder it.

Now for the word *Δίκαῖοι*, which your Lordship renders [clear from sin] I am sure no man is so justified in this world, as to be clear from sin ; and if we all be sinners, and yet treated as just persons, it is certain we are just by imputation only, that is, Christ imputing our faith, and sincere, though not unerring obedience, to us for righteousness : And then the *Antithesis* must hold thus : By Christ comes justification to life, as by *Adam* came the curse or the sin to the condemnation of death : But our justification which comes by Christ is by imputation and acceptilation, by grace and favour ; not that we are made really, that is, legally and perfectly righteous, but by imputation of faith and obedience to us, as if it were perfect : And therefore *Adam's* sin was but by imputation only to certain purposes ; not real, or proper, not formal, or inherent. For the grace by Christ, is more than the sin by *Adam* : if therefore that was not legal and proper, but evangelical and gracious, favourable and imputative, much more is the sin of *Adam* in us improperly, and by imputation. * And truly, my Lord, I think that no sound Divine of any of our Churches will say that we are *δικαιοῦντες* or *δίκαῖοι* in any other sense : not that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us without any inherent graces in us, but that our imperfect services, our true faith and sincere endeavours of obedience are imputed to us for righteousness through Jesus Christ ; and since it is certainly so, I am sure the *Antithesis* between Christ and *Adam*, can never be salved by making us sinners really by *Adam*, and yet just or righteous by Christ only in acceptation and imputation. For then sin should abound more than grace ; expressly against the honour of our blessed

ed Saviour, the glory of our redemption, and the words of *S. Paul*. But rather on the contrary is it true, That though by *Christ* we were really and legally made perfectly made righteous, it follows not that we were made sinners by *Adam* in the same manner and measure: for this similitude of *S. Paul* ought not to extend to an equality in all things; but still the advantage and prerogative, the abundance and the excess must be on the part of Grace: for *if sin does abound, grace does much more abound*; and we do more partake of righteousness by *Christ*, than of sin by *Adam*. *Christ* and *Adam* are the several fountains of emanation, and are compared *æque*, but not *equaliter*. Therefore this argument holds redundantly, since by *Christ* we are not made legally righteous, but by imputation only; much less are we made sinners by *Adam*. This in my sense is so infinitely far from being an objection, that it perfectly demonstrates the main question; and for my part I mean to rely upon it.

As for that which your Lordship adds out of *Rom. 5. 19*. That *ἁμαρτωλοὶ*, signifies sinners, not by imitation, as the *Pelagians* dream, but sinners really and effectively; I shall not need to make any other reply; but that, 1. I do not approve of that gloss of the *Pelagians*, that in *Adam* we are made sinners by imitation; and much less of that which affirms, we are made so properly and formally. But [made sinners] signifies, us'd like sinners; so as [justified] signifies treated like just persons: In which interpretation I follow *S. Paul*, not the *Pelagians*; they who are on the other side of the question, follow neither. And unless men take in their opinion before they read; and resolve not to understand *S. Paul* in this Epistle, I wonder why they should fancy that all that he says sounds that way which they commonly dream of: But as men fancy, so the Bells will ring. But I know your Lordships grave and wiser judgment, sees not only this that I have now opened, but much beyond it, and that you will be a zealous advocate for the truth of God, and for the honour of his justice, wisdom and mercy.

That which follows makes me believe your Lordship resolv'd to try me, by speaking your own sense in the line, and your temptation in the interline. For when your Lordship had said that "[My arguments for the vindication of God's goodness and justice are sound and holy]" your hand run it over again and added [as abstracted

stracted from the case of Original Sin,] But why should this be abstracted from the whole Oeconomy of God, from all his other dispensations? It is in all cases of the world unjust for God, to impute our fathers sins to us unto eternal condemnation; and is it otherwise in this only? Certainly a man would think this were the more favourable case; as being a single act, done but once, repented of after it was done, not consented to by the parties interested, not stipulated by God that it should be so, and being against all laws, and all the reason of the world: therefore it were but reason that if any where, here much rather, God's justice and goodness should be relied upon as the measure of the event. * And if in other cases laws be never given to Idiots and Infants and persons incapable, why should they be given here? But if they were not capable of a Law, then neither could they be of Sin; for where there is no law, there is no transgression. And it is unjust to condemn one man to Hell for all the sin of a thousand of his Ancestors actually done by them? And shall it be accounted just to damn all the world for one sin of one man? But if it be said, that it is unjust to damn the innocent for the sin of another; but the world is not innocent, but really guilty in *Adam*. Besides that this is a begging of the question, it is also against common sense, to say that a man is not innocent of that which was done before he had a being; for if that be not sufficient, then it is impossible for a man to be innocent. And if this way of answer be admitted, any man may be damned for the sin of any Father; because it may be said here as well as there, that although the innocent must not perish for another's fault, yet the Son is not innocent as being in his Father's loins when the fault was committed, and the law calls him and makes him guilty. And if it were so indeed, this were so far from being an excuse, to say that the Law makes him guilty, that this were absolute tyranny, and the thing that were to be complain'd of.

I hope, by this time your Lordship perceives, that I have no reason to fear that I prevaricate *S. Paul's* rule: *μὴ ὑπερβρῆν παρ' ὅσα βρῆν.* I only endeavour to understand *S. Paul's* words, and I read them, *κατ' ἀναλογίαν πίστεως*, in proportion to, and so as they may not intrench upon, the reputation of God's goodness and justice: that's *βρῆν εἰς τὸ σωθῆναι*, to be wise unto sobriety. But they that do so *δουλοῦν ὑποδίσσει*, as to resolve it to be so, whether

whether God be honoured in it, or dishonour'd, and to answer all arguments, whether they can or cannot be answered, and to efform all their Theology to the air of that one great proposition, and to find out ways for God to proceed in, which he hath never told of, ὁδοὶ ἀβυσσῶν, ways that are crooked and not to be insisted in, ways that are not right, if these men do not παρερρηγμένον παρ' ὃ δὲ φρονεῖν, then I hope I shall have less need to fear that I do, who do none of these things.

And in proportion to my security here, I am confident that I am unconcern'd in the consequent threatening. If any man shall Evangelize, παρ' ὃ παρελάβετε, any other doctrine than what ye have received, something for Gospel which is not Gospel, something that ye have not received, let him be accursed. My Lord, if what I teach were not that which we have received, that God is just and righteous, and true : that the soul that sins, the same shall die : that we shall have no cause to say, The Fathers have eaten sowre Grapes, and the Childrens teeth are set on edge : that God is a gracious Father, pardoning iniquity, and therefore not exacting it where it is not : that Infants are from their Mothers wombs beloved of God their Father : that of such is the Kingdom of God : that he pities those souls who cannot discern the right hand from the left, as he declared in the case of the *Ninevites* : that to Infants there are special Angels appointed, who always behold the face of God : that Christ took them in his arms and blessed them, and therefore they are not hated by God, and accursed heirs of Hell, and coheirs with Satan, that the Messiah was promis'd before any children were born ; as certainly as that *Adam* sinned before they were born : that if sin abounds, grace does superabound, and therefore children are with greater effect involv'd in the grace than they could be in the sin : and the sin must be gone before it could do them mischief : if this were not the doctrine of both Testaments, and if the contrary were, then the threatening of *S. Paul* might well be held up against me : but else, my Lord, to shew such a Scorpion to him that speaks the truth of God in sincerity and humility, though it cannot make me to betray the truth, and the honour of God, yet the very fear and affrightment which must needs seize upon every good man that does but behold it, or hear the words of that angry voice, shall and hath made me to pray, not only that my self may

may be preserved in truth, but that it would please God to bring into the way of truth, all such as have erred and are deceived.

My Lord, I humbly thank your Lordship for your grave and pious Counsel, and kils the hand that reaches forth so paternal a rod. I see you are tender both of truth and me: and though I have not made this tedious reply to cause trouble to your Lordship, or to steal from you any part of your precious time, yet because I see your Lordship was perswaded *induere personam*, to give some little countenance to a popular error out of jealousie against a less usual truth, I thought it my duty to represent to your Lordship such things, by which as I can, so I ought to be defended against captious objectors. It is hard when men will not be patient of truth, because another man offers it to them, and they did not first take it in, or if they did, were not pleas'd to own it.

But from your Lordship I expect, and am sure to find the effects of your piety, wisdom and learning, and that an error for being popular shall not prevail against so necessary, though unobserved truth. A necessary truth I call it; because without this I do not understand how we can declare God's righteousness and justify him, with whom unrighteousness cannot dwell: But if men of a contrary opinion, can reconcile their usual Doctrines of Original Sin with God's justice, and goodness and truth, I shall be well pleased with it, and think better of their Doctrine than now I can.

But until that be done, it were well (my Lord) if men would not trouble themselves or the Church with impertinent contradictions; but patiently give leave to have truth advanced, and God justified in his sayings and in his judgments, and the Church improved, and all errors confuted, that what did so prosperously begin the Reformation, may be admitted to bring it to perfection, that men may no longer go *quà itur*, but *quà eundum est*.

THE

T H E
Bishop of Rochester's Letter
T O
D^R TAYLOR,
W I T H A N

Account of the Particulars there
given in Charge.

Worthy Sir,

L E T me request you to weigh that of *St. Paul*, *Ephes. 2. 5.* which are urged by some Ancients; and to remember, how often he calls *Concupiscence Sin*; whereby it is urg'd, that although Baptism take away the guilt as concretively redounding to the person, yet the simple abstracted guilt, as to the Nature remains: for Sacraments are administer'd to Persons, not to Natures. I confess, I find not the Fathers so fully, and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till *Pelagius* had pudled the stream: but, after this, you may find *S. Jerome* in *Hes.* saying, *In Paradiso omnes prævaricati sunt in Adamo.* And *S. Ambrose* in *Rom. 1. 5.* *Manifestum est omnes peccasse in Adam, quasi in massâ, ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex eo sumus omnes;* and as *Greg. 39. Hom. in Ezek.* *Sine culpâ in mundo esse non potest, qui in mundum cum culpâ venit;* but *S. Austin* is so frequent, so full and clear in his assertions, that his words and reasons will require your most judicious examinations, and more strict weighing of them: He saith *Epist. 107.* *Scimus secundum Adam nos primâ nativitate contagium mortis contrahere; nec liberamur à supplicio mortis æternæ nisi per gratiam renascamur in Christo;* *Id. de verb. Apost. Ser. 4.* *Peccatum à primo homine in omnes homines pertransiit, etenim illud peccatum non in fonte mansit, sed pertransiit, and Rom. 5. ubi te invenit? venundatum sub peccato, trahentem peccatum primi hominis, habentem peccatum antequam possis habere arbitrium.* *Id. de præ-*

prædestin. & grat. c. 2. *Si infans unius diei non sit sine peccato, qui proprium habere non potuit, conficitur, ut illud traxerit alienum; de quo Apost. Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum; quod qui negat, negat profecto nos esse mortales; quoniam mors est pœna peccati. Sequitur, necesse est, pœna peccatum. Id. encihr. c. 9. 29. Sola gratia redemptos discernit à perditis, quos in unam perditionis massam concreverat ab origine dñcia communis contagio. Id. de peccator. mer. & remiss. l. 1. c. 3. Concupiscentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi in obedientia contra dominatum mentis. Quid potest, aut potuit nasci ex servo, nisi servus? ideo sicut omnis homo ab Adamo est, ita & omnis homo per Adamum servus est peccati. Rom. 5. Falluntur ergo omnino, qui dicunt mortem solam, non & peccatum transiisse in genus humanum. Prosper. resp. ad articulum Augustino falsò impostum; Omnes homines prævaricationis reos, & damnationi obnoxios nasci periturosque nisi in Christo renascamur, asserimus. Tho. 12. q. 8. Secundum fidem Catholicam tenendum est, quod primum peccatum primi hominis, originaliter transit in posteros, propter quod etiam pueri mox nati deferuntur ad baptismum ab interiore culpâ abluendi. Contrarium est hæresis Pelag. unde peccatum quod sic à primo parente derivatur, dicitur Originale, sicut peccatum, quod ab animâ derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale. Bonavent. in 2. sent. dist. 31. Sicut peccatum actuale tribuitur alicui ratione singularis persone: ita peccatum originale tribuitur ratione Nature; corpus infectum traducitur, quia persona Ade infecit naturam, & natura infecit personam. Anima enim inficitur à carne per colligantiam, quum unita carni traxit ad se alterius proprietates. Lombar. 2. Sent. dist. 31. Peccatum originale per corruptionem carnis, in animâ sit: in vase enim dignoscitur vitium esse, quod vinum accescit.*

If you take into consideration the Covenant made between Almighty God and Adam, as relating to his posterity, it may conduce to the satisfaction of those who urge it for a proof of Original Sin. Now that the work may prosper under your hands to the manifestation of God's glory, the edification of the Church, and the satisfaction of all good Christians, is the hearty prayer of

Your Fellow Servant in our most

Blessed Lord Christ Jesu,

Jo. Roffen.

My Lord,

I Perceive that you have a great Charity to every one of the sons of the Church, that your Lordship refuses not to solicit their objections, and to take care that every man be answered that can make objections against my Doctrine; but as your Charity makes you refuse no work or labour of love: so shall my duty and obedience make me ready to perform any commandment that can be relative to so excellent a principle.

I am indeed sorry your Lordship is thus haunted with objections about the Question of Original Sin; but because you are pleas'd to hand them to me, I cannot think them so inconsiderable, as in themselves they seem; for what your Lordship thinks worthy the reporting from others, I must think are fit to be answered and returned by me.

In your Lordship's of November 10. these things I am to reply to:

Let me request you to weigh that of S. Paul, Ephes. 2. 5. The words are these; [*Even when we were dead in sins, (God) hath quickened us together with Christ*] which words I do not at all suppose relate to the matter of *Original Sin*, but to the state of *Heathen Sins, habitual Idolatries and Impurities*; in which the world was dead before the great Reformation by Christ, And I do not know any Expositor of note that suspects any other sense of it; and the second Verse of that Chapter makes it so certain and plain, that it is too visible to insist upon it longer. But your Lordship adds further,

And to remember how often he calls Concupiscence Sin [I know S. Paul reckons Concupiscence to be one of the works of the flesh, and consequently such as excludes from Heaven, Col. 3. 5. *Evil Concupiscence*] concupiscence with something superadded, but certainly that is nothing that is *natural*; for God made nothing that is evil, and whatsoever is *natural* and *necessary* cannot be mortified; but this may and must, and the Apostle calls upon us to do it; but

but that this is a superinducing, and an *actual* or *habitual* *lusting* appears by the following words, verse 7. *in which ye also walked sometimes when ye lived in them*, such a concupiscence as that which is the effect of habitual sins, or an estate of sins, of which the Apostle speaks, *Rom. 7. 8. Sin taking occasion by the Commandment, wrought in me all manner of Concupiscence*; that is, so great a itate of evil, such strong inclinations and desires to sin, that I grew as captive under it; it introduced a necessity like those in S. Peter, who had eyes *ματὲς μοιχαλίδος*, full of an Adulterers: the women had possessed their eyes, and therefore they were *ἀγαπάουσιν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*, they could not cease from sin: because having *πάντου ὀπιθυμίαν*, all concupiscence, that is, the very spirit of sinful desires, they could relish nothing but the productions of sin, they could fancy nothing but Colloquintida and Toadstools of the Earth. * Once more I find S. Paul speaking of Concupiscence, 1 *Theff. 4. 5. Let every man know to possess his vessel in holiness and honour, not in the lust of concupiscence, as do the Gentiles which know not God.* In the *lust of Concupiscence*, that is plainly in lustfulness and impurity: for it is a Hebraism, where a superlative is usually expressed by the *synonymon*: as *Lutum canis*; *pluvia imbris*; so the Gall of bitterneß and the iniquity of sins; *Robur virium*; the blackneß of darkneß, that is, *σκότος ἐξόπτερον*, the outer darkneß, or the greatest darkneß! so here the *lust of Concupiscence*, that is, the vilest and basest of it. I know no where else that the Apostle uses the word in any sence. But the like is to be said of the word *lust*, which the Apostle often uses, for the *habits produced* or the *pregnant desires*, but never for the natural principle and affection, when he speaks of sin.

But your Lordship is pleased to add a subtlety in pursuance of your former advices and notices, which I confess I shall never understand.

Although Baptism take away the guilt as concretively redounding to the person, yet the simple abstracted guilt as to the Nature remains; for Sacraments are administred to persons, not to natures.] This I suppose those persons, from whom your Lordship reports it, intended as an answer to a secret objection. For if Concupiscence be a sin, and yet remains after Baptism, then what good does Baptism effect? But if it be no sin after, then it is no sin before. To this it is answered as you see: there is a double guilt; a *guilt of person*, and of *nature*. This is taken away,

this

this is not: for, Sacraments are given to Persons, not to Natures.

But first, where is there such a distinction set down in Scripture, or in the prime Antiquity, or in any moral Philosopher? There is no humane nature but what is in the Persons of men; and tho' our Understanding can make a separate consideration of these, or rather consider a Person in a double Capacity, in his personal and in his natural; that is, (if I am to speak sense) a person may be consider'd in that which is proper to him, and in that which is common to him and others; yet these two considerations cannot make two distinct subjects capable of such different events. I will put it to the trial.

This Guilt that is in nature, what is it? Is it the same thing that was in the person? That is, is it an obligation to punishment? If it be not, I know not the meaning of the word, and therefore I have nothing to do with it. If it be, then if this guilt, or obligation to punishment, remains in the nature after it is taken from the person, then if this concupiscence deserve Damnation, this nature shall be damned, though the person be saved. Let the Objectors, my Lord, chuse which they will. If it does not deserve damnation, why do they say it does? If it does, then the guilty may suffer what they deserve, but the innocent or absolved must not; the person then being acquitted, and the nature not acquitted, the nature shall be damn'd and the person be sav'd.

But if it be said that the guilt remains in the nature to certain purposes, but not to all; then I reply, so it does in the person; for it is in the person after Baptism, so as to be a perpetual possibility and proneness to sin, and a Principle of trouble; and if it be no otherwise in the nature, then this distinction is to no purpose; if it be otherwise in the nature, then it brings damnation to it, when it brings none to the Man, and then the former argument must return. But whether it prevail or no, yet I cannot but note, that what is here affirm'd is expressly against the words commonly attributed to St. Cyprian, (*De ablutione pedum*) *Sic abluit quos parentalis labes infecerat, ut nec actualis nec Originalis macula post ablutionem illam ulla sui vestigia derelinquat*: How this supposing it of Baptism can be reconcil'd with the guilt remaining in the nature, I confess I cannot give an account. It is expressly against St. Austin, (*Tom. 9. Tract, 41. in Johan. Epist. ad Ocean.*) saying, *deleta est tota Iniquitas!*

quitas! expressly against St. Hierome, Quomodo justificati sumus & sanctificati, si peccatum aliquid in nobis relinquitur?

But again, (My Lord) I did suppose that *Concupiscence* or *Original Sin* had been founded in nature, and had not been a *personal* but a *natural evil*. I am sure so the Article of our Church affirms; *it is the fault and corruption of our Nature*. And so S. Bonaventure affirms, in the words cited by your Lordship in your Letter; *Sicut peccatum actuale tribuitur alicui ratione singularis personæ: ita peccatum originis tribuitur ratione naturæ*. Either then the Sacrament must have effect upon our Nature, to purifie that which is vitiated by Concupiscence, or else it does no good at all. For if the guilt or sin be founded in the nature, (as the Article affirms) and Baptism does not take off the guilt from the nature, then it does nothing.

Now since your Lordship is pleas'd, in the behalf of the Objectors, so warily to avoid what they thought pressing, I will take leave to use the Advantages it ministers: for so the Serpent teaches us where to strike him, by his so warily and guiltily defending his Head. I therefore argue thus:

Either Baptism does not take off the guilt of Original Sin, or else there may be punishment where there is no guilt, or else natural death was not it which God threatened as the punishment of *Adams* fact. For it is certain, that all Men die as well after Baptism as before; and more after than before. That which would be properly the consequent of this *Dilemma*, is this, that when God threatened Death to *Adam*, saying, *On the day thou eatest of the tree thou shalt die the death*, he inflicted and intended to inflict the evils of a troublesome mortal life. For *Adam* did not die that day, but *Adam* began to be miserable that day, to live upon hard labour, to eat fruits from an accursed field, till he should return to the Earth whence he was taken, (*Gen. 3. 17, 18, 19.*) So that death in the common sense of the word was to be the end of his labour, not so much the punishment of the sin. For it is probable he should have gone off from the scene of this world to a better, though he had not sinn'd; but if he had not sinn'd, he should not be so afflicted, and he should not have died daily till he had died finally; that is, till he had returned to his dust whence he was taken, and whither he would naturally have gone: and it is no new thing in Scripture that

miserias

mife
(Ex
12.
bein
argu
Sin
true
In A
it is
it is
and
B
have
whe
nifh
thou
wou
ads
that
the
plea
have
it m
shal
con
Dea
he p
fes,
and
but
offe
son
A
obj
this
F
F
Con
I
say
lick
my
and
scen

miseries and infelicities should be call'd *dying* or *death*, (*Exod.* 10. 17. *1 Cor.* 15. 31. *2 Cor.* 1. 10. & 4. 10, 11, 12. & 11. 23.) But I only note this as probable, as not being willing to admit what the *Socinians* answer in this argument; who affirm that God threatening death to the Sin of *Adam*, meant *death eternal*: which is certainly not true; as we learn from the words of the Apostle, saying, *In Adam we all die*; which is not true of *death eternal*, but it is true of the miseries and calamities of Mankind, and it is true of temporal death in the sense now explicated, and in that which is commonly received.

But I add also this Problem. That which would have been had there been no sin, and that which remains when the sin or guiltiness is gon, is not properly the punishment of the sin. But dissolution of the soul and body should have been, if *Adam* had not sinn'd, for the world would have been too little to have entertain'd those myriads of men, which must in all reason have been born from that blessing of *Increase and multiply*, which was given at the first Creation; and to have confin'd mankind to the pleasures of this world, in case he had not fallen, would have been a punishment of his Innocence; but however, it might have been, though God had not been angry, and shall still be, even when the sin is taken off. The proper consequent of this will be, that when the Apostle says, *Death came in by Sin*, and that *Death is the Wages of sin*, he primarily and literally means the solemnities, and causes, and infelicities, and untimeliness of temporal death, and not merely the dissolution, which is directly no evil, but an inlet to a better state. But I insist not on this, but offer it to the consideration of inquisitive and modest Persons.

And now, that I may return thither from whence this objection brought me; I consider that if any should urge this Argument to me:

Baptism delivers from Original Sin.

Baptism does not deliver from *Concupiscence*, therefore *Concupiscence* is not Original Sin.

I did not know well what to answer; I could possibly say something to satisfy the boys and young men at a publick disputation, but not to satisfy my self when I am upon my knees, and giving an account to God of all my secret and hearty persuasions. But I consider, that by *Concupiscence* must be meant either the first inclinations to their

Object, or the proper acts of Election, which are the second acts of *Concupiscence*. If the first inclinations be meant, then certainly that cannot be a sin which is *natural*, and which is *necessary*. For I consider that *Concupiscence* and natural desires are like Hunger; which while it is natural and necessary, is not for the destruction but conservation of man; when it goes beyond the limits of nature, it is violent and a disease; and so is *Concupiscence*: But desires or lustings, when they are taken for the natural propensity to their proper object, are so far from being a sin, that they are the Instruments of felicity for this duration, and when they grow towards being irregular, they may, if we please, grow instruments of felicity in order to the other duration, because they may serve a vertue by being restrained: And *to desire* that to which all men tend naturally, is no more a sin than to desire to be happy is a sin: *Desire* is no more a sin than *joy* or *sorrow* is; neither can it be fancied why one passion more than another can be in its whole nature criminal; either all or none are so; when either of them grows irregular or inordinate, Joy is as bad as Desire, and Fear as bad as either.

But if by *Concupiscence* we mean the second acts of it, that is, avoidable consentings, and deliberate elections, then let it be as much condemned as the Apostle and all the Church after him hath sentenc'd it; but then it is not *Adam's* sin, but our own by which we are condemned; for it is not his fault that we chuse: If we chuse, it is our own; if we chuse not, it is no fault. For there is a natural act of the Will, as well as of the Understanding; and in the choice of the supream Good, and in the first Apprehension of its proper object, the Will is as natural as any other faculty; and the other faculties have degrees of adherence as well as the Will: so have the potestative and intellective Faculties; they are delighted in their best objects. But because these only are natural, and the will is natural sometimes, but not always, there it is that a difference can be,

For I consider, if the first *Concupiscence* be a sin, Original Sin, (for actual it is not) and that this is *properly*, *personally*, and *inherently* our sin by traduction, that is, if our will be necessitated to sin by *Adam's* fall, as it must needs be if it can sin when it cannot deliberate, then there can be no reason told, why it is more a sin to will evil, than to understand it: and how does that which is moral
differ

differ from that which is natural? For the understanding is first and primely moved by its object, and in that motion by nothing else but by God, who moves all things; and if that which hath nothing else to move it but the object, yet is not free; it is strange that the will can in any sense be free, when it is necessitated by *wisdom* and by *power*, and by *Adam*, that is, *from within* and *from without*, besides what *God* and *violence* do and can do.

But in this I have not only Scripture and all the reason of the world on my side, but the complying sentences of the most eminent writers of the Primitive Church: I need not trouble my self with citations of many of them, since *Calvin* (*lib. 3. Instit. c. 3. Sect. 10.*) confesses that *St. Austin* hath collected their testimonies, and is of their opinion, that Concupiscence is not a *sin*, but an *infirmity* only. But I will here set down the words of *St. Chrysostome* (*Hemil. 13. in Epist. Rom.*) because they are very clear; *Ipsæ passiones in se peccatum non sunt: Effrenata vero ipsarum immoderantia peccatum operata est. Concupiscentia quidem peccatum non est; quando vero egressa modum foras eruperit, tunc demum adulterium fit, non à Concupiscentia, sed à nimio. Et illicito illius luxu.*

By the way I cannot but wonder why men are pleas'd, whereever they find the word *Concupiscence* in the New Testament, presently to dream of *Original Sin*, and make that to be the sum total of it; whereas *Concupiscence*, if it were the product of *Adam's* fall, is but one small part of it; [*Et ut exempli gratia unam illarum tradem*] said *St. Chrysostome* in the fore-cited place; *Concupiscence* is but one of the passions, and in the utmost extension of the word, it can be taken but for one half of the passion; for not only all the passions of the concupiscible faculty can be a principle of sin: but the *Irascible* does more hurt in the world; *that* is more *sensual*, *this* is more *devillish*. The reason why I note this, is because upon this account it will seem, that *Concupiscence* is no more to be called a sin than *anger* is; and as *St. Paul* said, *Be angry, but sin not*; so he might have said, *Desire, or lust, but sin not*. For there are some lustings and desires without sin, as well as some *Angers*; and that which is indifferent to vertue and vice, cannot of it self be a vice; To which I add, that if *Concupiscence* taken for all desires be a sin, then so are all the passions of the *Irascible* faculty. Why one more than the other, is not to be told; but

that Anger in the first Motions is not a sin, appears, because it is not always sinful in the second; a Man may be actually angry, and yet really innocent: and so he may be *lustful* and *full of desire*, and yet he may be not only that which is good, or he may overcome his desires to that which is bad. I have now considered what your Lordship received from others, and gave me in Charge your self, concerning Concupiscence.

Your next Charge is concerning *Antiquity*, intimating, that although the first antiquity is not clearly against me, yet the second is. For thus your Lordship is pleased to write their Objection, [*I confess I find not the Fathers so fully and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till Pelagius had puddled the stream; but after this you may find St. Jerome, &c.*]

That the Fathers of the first Four Hundred years did speak plainly and fully of it, is so evident as nothing more, and I appeal to their testimonies as they are set down in the papers annexed in their proper place; and therefore that must needs be one of the little arts by which some men use to escape from the pressure of that Authority, by which because they would have other men concluded, sometimes upon strict enquiry they find themselves entangled. Original Sin as it is at this day commonly explicated, was not the Doctrine of the Primitive Church; but when *Pelagius* had puddled the stream, *St. Austin* was so angry that he stamp'd and disturbed it more: And truly my Lord, I do not think that the Gentlemen that urg'd against me *St. Austin's* opinion, do well consider that I profess my self to follow those Fathers that were before him, and whom *St. Austin* did forsake as I do him in the question. They may as well press me with his Authority in the Article of the damnation of Infants dying unbaptiz'd, or of absolute predestination: In which Article, *St. Austin's* words are equally urg'd by the *Jansenists* and *Molinists*, by the *Remonstrants* and *Contra-remonstrants*, and they can serve both, and therefore cannot determine me. But then (my Lord) let it be remembred, that they are as much against *St. Chrysostome* as I am against *St. Austin*, with this only difference; that *St. Chrysostome* speaks constantly in the argument, which *St. Austin* did not, and particularly in that part of it which concerns *Concupiscence*. For in the enquiry whether it be a sin or no, he speaks so variously, that though *Calvin* complains of him, that he calls it only an *infirmity*, yet he also brings Testimonies from him to prove it to be a
sin,

fin, and let any man try if he can tie these words together, (*De peccator. mer. & remission. l. 1. c. 3.*) *Concupiscentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis*: Which are the words your Lordship quotes: Concupiscence is a sin, because it is a disobedience to the Empire of the spirit. But yet in another place, (*lib. 1. de Civit. Dei, cap. 25.*) *Illa Concupiscentialis inobedientia quanto magis absque culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si absque culpa est in corpore dormientis?* It is a sin, and it is no sin; it is criminal, but without fault; it is culpable because it is a disobedience, and yet this disobedience without actual consent is not culpable. If I do believe St. *Austin*, I must disbelieve him; and which part soever I take, I shall be reproved by the same Authority. But when the Fathers are divided from each other, or themselves, it is indifferent to follow either; but when any of them are divided from Reason and Scripture, then it is not indifferent for us to follow *them*, and neglect these; and yet if these who object St. *Austin's* authority to my Doctrine, will be content to be subject to all that he says, I am content they shall follow him in this too, provided that they will give me my liberty, because I will not be tied to him that speaks contrary things to himself, and contrary to them that went before him; and though he was a rare person, yet he was as fallible as any of my brethren at this day. He was followed by many ignorant ages, and all the world knows by what accidental advantages he acquir'd a great reputation: but he who made no scruple of deserting all his predecessors, must give us leave upon the strength of his own reasons to quit his authority.

All that I shall observe is this, that the Doctrine of *Original Sin*, as it is explicated by St. *Austin*, had two parents; one was the Doctrine of the *Encratites*, and some other Hereticks, who forbid Marriage, and supposing it to be evil, thought they were warranted to say, it was the bed of sin, and children the spawn of vipers and sinners. And St. *Austin* himself, and especially St. *Hierome*, (whom your Lordship cites) speaks some things of marriage, which if they were true, then marriage were highly to be refused, as being the Increaser of sin rather than of children; and a semination in the flesh, and contrary to the spirit, and such a thing, which being mingled with sin, produces univocal issues, the mother and the daughter are so alike that they are the worse again. For if a proper inherent sin

be

be effected by chaste marriages, then they are in this particular equal to adulterous embraces, and rather to be *pardon'd* than *allow'd*; and if all *Concupiscence* be vicious, then no marriage can be pure. These things perhaps have not been so much consider'd, but your Lordship I know remembers strange sayings in *St. Hierome*, in *Athenagoras*, and in *St. Austin*, which possibly have been countenanced and maintained at the charge of this opinion. But the other parent of this, is the Zeal against the *Pelagian* Heresie, which did serve it self by saying too little on this Article, and therefore was thought fit to be confuted by saying too much; and that I conjecture right in this affair, I appeal to the words that I cited out of *St. Austin* in the matter of *Concupiscence*; concerning which he speaks the same thing that I do, when he is disingag'd; as in his books *de civitate Dei*. but in his Tractate *de peccatorum meritis & remissione*, which was written in his heat against the *Pelagians*, he speaks quite contrary. And whoever shall, with observation, read his one book of Original Sin against *Pelagius*, his two books *de Nuptiis & Concupiscentia* to *Valerius*, his three books to *Marcellinus*, *de peccatorum meritis & remissione*, his four books to *Boniface*, *contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum*, his six books to *Claudius* against *Julianus*, and shall think himself bound to believe all that this excellent man wrote, will not only find it impossible he should, but will have reason to say, that zeal against an error is not always the best Instrument to find out truth. The same complaint hath been made of others, and *St. Jerome* hath suffer'd deeply in the infirmity. I shall not therefore trouble your Lordship with giving particular answers to the words of *St. Jerome* and *St. Ambrose*, because (besides what I have already said) I do not think that their words are an argument fit to conclude against so much Evidence, nor against a much less than that which I have every where brought in this Article, tho' indeed their words are capable of a fair interpretation, and besides the words quoted out of *St. Ambrose* are none of his; and for *Aquinas*, *Lombard*, and *Bonaventure*, your Lordship might as well press me with the opinion of *Mr. Calvin*, *Knox*, and *Buchanan*, with the Synod of *Dort*, or the *Scots Presbyters*. I know they are against me, and therefore I reprove them for it, but it is no disparagment to the truth, that other men are in error. And yet of all the School-men, *Bonaventure* should least have been urg'd against me, for the Proverb's sake: for *Adam non peccavit in Bonaventura*; *Alexander of Hales* would often say, that *Adam* never sinn'd in *Bonaventure*. But it may be he was not in earnest; no more am I.

The

The last thing your Lordship gives to me in Charge in the behalf of the objectors, is, that *I would take into consideration the Covenant made between Almighty God and Adam, as relating to his posterity.*

To this I answer, That I know of no such thing; God made a Covenant with *Adam* indeed, and us'd the Right of his Dominion over his Posterity, and yet did nothing but what was just; but I find in Scripture no mention made of any such Covenant as is dreamt of about the matter of Original Sin: only the Covenant of works God did make with all men till Christ came; but he did never exact it after *Adam*; but for a Covenant that God should make with *Adam*, that if he stood, all his posterity should be I know not what; and if he fell, they should be in a damnable condition, of this (I say) there is *nec vola nec vestigium* in holy Scripture, that ever I could meet with: if there had been any such Covenant, it had been but equity that to all the persons interessed it should have been communicated, and caution given to all who were to suffer, and abilities given to them to prevent the evil: for else it is not a Covenant with them, but a Decree concerning them; and it is impossible that there should be a Covenant made between two, when one of the Parties knows nothing of it.

I will enter no further into this enquiry, but only observe, that though there was no such Covenant, yet the event that hapned might without any such Covenant have justly entred in at many doors. It is one thing to say that God by *Adam's* sin was moved to a severer entercourse with his posterity, for that is certainly true; and it is another thing to say that *Adam's* sin of it self did deserve all the evil that came actually upon his children; Death is the wages of sin, one death for one sin; but not 10000 millions for one sin; but therefore the Apostle affirms it to have descended on all, *in as much as all men have sinn'd*; But if from a sinning Parent a good child descends; the child's innocence will more prevail with God for kindness, than the fathers sin shall prevail for trouble. *Non omnia parentum peccata dii in liberos convertunt, sed si quis de malo nascitur bonus, tanquam bene affectus corpore natus de morbofo, is generis poenâ liberatur, tanquam ex improbitatis domo, in aliam familiam datus: qui vero morbo in similitudinem generis refertur atque redigitur vitiosi, ei nimirum convenit tanquam hæredi debitas poenas vitii persolvere,* said Plutarch (*De iis qui*

sero à Numine puniuntur. ex interpr. Cluserii.) God does not always make the fathers sins descend upon the children. But if a good child is born of a bad father, like a healthful body from an ill-affected one, he is freed from the punishment of his stock, and passes from the house of wickedness into another family. But he who inherits the disease, he also must be heir of the punishment; *Quorum natura amplexa est cognatam malitiam, hos Justitia similitudinem pravitatis persequens supplico affecit*, if they pursue their kindreds wickedness, they shall be pursued by a cognation of judgment.

Other ways there are by which it may come to pass that the sins of others may descend upon us. He that is *Author* or the *perswader*, the *minister* or the *helper*, the *approver* or the *follower*, may derive the sins of others to himself, but then it is not their sins only, but our own too, and it is like a dead Taper put to a burning light and held there, this derives light and flames from the other, and yet then hath it of its own, but they dwell together and make one body. These are the ways by which punishment can enter, but there are evils which are no punishments, and they may come upon more accounts, by *Gods Dominion*, by *natural consequence*, by *infection*, by *destitution* and *dereliction*, for the *glory of God*, by right of authority, for the *institution* or *exercise* of the sufferers, or for their *more immediate good*.

But that directly and properly one should be punish'd for the sins of others was indeed practis'd by some Common-wealths; *Utilitatis specie sapissimè in repub. peccari*, said *Cicero*, they do it sometimes for terror, and because their ways of preventing evil is very imperfect: and when *Pedianus secundus* the *Pretor* was kill'd by a Slave, all the family of them was kill'd in punishment; this was *secundum veterem mortem*, said *Tacit.* (*Annal.* 14.) for in the slaughter of *Marcellus* the slaves fled for fear of such usage; it was thus, I say, among the *Romans*, but *habuit aliquid iniqui*, and God forbid we should say such things of the fountain of justice and mercy. But I have done, and will move no more stones, but hereafter carry them as long as I can, rather than make a noise by throwing them down; I shall only add this one thing: I was troubled with an objection lately; for it being propounded to me, why it is to be believed that the sin of *Adam* could spoil the nature of man, and yet the nature of Devils could not be spoiled by their sin which was worse; I could not well tell what to say, and therefore I held my peace.

T H E E N D.

